Beat the Press

Beat the press por Dean Baker

Beat the Press is Dean Baker's commentary on economic reporting. He is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). To never miss a post, subscribe to a weekly email roundup of Beat the Press. Please also consider supporting the blog on Patreon.

The Washington Post had a nice piece on the potential impact of the recovery of the housing market on the economy. The piece reasonably assumes that construction returns to its long-term trend share of GDP, rather than getting back to its bubble levels of the last decade. In this case it will make a substantial contribution to the recovery, although it still will not possible to return to full employment without large budget deficits, unless there is a substantial reduction in the size of the trade deficit.

 

The Washington Post had a nice piece on the potential impact of the recovery of the housing market on the economy. The piece reasonably assumes that construction returns to its long-term trend share of GDP, rather than getting back to its bubble levels of the last decade. In this case it will make a substantial contribution to the recovery, although it still will not possible to return to full employment without large budget deficits, unless there is a substantial reduction in the size of the trade deficit.

 

There is a serious effort by corporate honchos to cut Social Security and Medicare in the lame duck session of Congress. As has been reporting in several major media outlets, this campaign has raised tens of millions of dollars for this purpose.

Readers of a NYT “fact-check” on the presidential debate were no doubt wondering whether the paper had sold space to this campaign. The fact-check was addressing the question of whether Governor Romney wanted to increase military spending by $2.3 trillion over the course of the decade. At one point the piece told readers:

“The drop in military budgets as a share of G.D.P. is due less to any reductions for the Pentagon and more to the fact that a growing piece of the federal budget pie is being consumed by spending for entitlement programs like Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security as more baby boomers reach retirement age.”

Of course that one makes no sense. Increased spending on Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security will raise their percentage of the budget and therefore could explain a decline in military spending as a share of the budget. It can only explain a decline in military spending as a share of GDP if spending on these programs raises GDP. While that is possible in a depressed economy, like the one we have seen the last 5 years, that is not the argument that we usually hear about these programs.

Furthermore, the Congressional Budget Office and other agencies do not project that the economy will remain depressed throughout the decade. Therefore this is assertion is not true in the context of the generally used budget projections. Presumably it just reflected a willingness of the NYT to get in a standard jibe about the growth of these programs, but skeptics may see the hand of the corporate campaign.

Thanks to Robert Naiman for calling this to my attention.   

 

There is a serious effort by corporate honchos to cut Social Security and Medicare in the lame duck session of Congress. As has been reporting in several major media outlets, this campaign has raised tens of millions of dollars for this purpose.

Readers of a NYT “fact-check” on the presidential debate were no doubt wondering whether the paper had sold space to this campaign. The fact-check was addressing the question of whether Governor Romney wanted to increase military spending by $2.3 trillion over the course of the decade. At one point the piece told readers:

“The drop in military budgets as a share of G.D.P. is due less to any reductions for the Pentagon and more to the fact that a growing piece of the federal budget pie is being consumed by spending for entitlement programs like Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security as more baby boomers reach retirement age.”

Of course that one makes no sense. Increased spending on Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security will raise their percentage of the budget and therefore could explain a decline in military spending as a share of the budget. It can only explain a decline in military spending as a share of GDP if spending on these programs raises GDP. While that is possible in a depressed economy, like the one we have seen the last 5 years, that is not the argument that we usually hear about these programs.

Furthermore, the Congressional Budget Office and other agencies do not project that the economy will remain depressed throughout the decade. Therefore this is assertion is not true in the context of the generally used budget projections. Presumably it just reflected a willingness of the NYT to get in a standard jibe about the growth of these programs, but skeptics may see the hand of the corporate campaign.

Thanks to Robert Naiman for calling this to my attention.   

 

A Washington Post fact check on the debate commented on a debate question on outsourcing:

“But economists are unanimous that trade, including outsourcing, is hugely beneficial to economic growth at home and abroad.”

This is highly misleading for two reasons. First, economists are unanimous in agreeing that trade could have major distributional consequences. And some prominent economists, such as Paul Krugman, have argued that the recent pattern of trade for the United States has had negative distributional consequences for large segment of the U.S. workforce.

The second reason that it is misleading is that economists are unanimous in believing that in the context of below full employment economy, like the one we have seen the last five years, a larger trade deficit implies lower growth and fewer jobs. In this context outsourcing hurts the economy.

 

A Washington Post fact check on the debate commented on a debate question on outsourcing:

“But economists are unanimous that trade, including outsourcing, is hugely beneficial to economic growth at home and abroad.”

This is highly misleading for two reasons. First, economists are unanimous in agreeing that trade could have major distributional consequences. And some prominent economists, such as Paul Krugman, have argued that the recent pattern of trade for the United States has had negative distributional consequences for large segment of the U.S. workforce.

The second reason that it is misleading is that economists are unanimous in believing that in the context of below full employment economy, like the one we have seen the last five years, a larger trade deficit implies lower growth and fewer jobs. In this context outsourcing hurts the economy.

 

It's always fun when Thomas Friedman writes a piece on economics. He likes to play a game with readers. He slips a number of false assertions into the column and readers are supposed to find them. (He probably does this with his columns on foreign policy also, but I don't have time to read through those columns.) Today's column is just chock full of these false assertions. Early on Friedman tells us: "many Americans understand something is very wrong, that we could go the way of Greece or Japan if we don’t shape up, and that they will embrace a candidate who trusts them with the truth, that is, an honest diagnosis of where we are and how we get out of this mess." That was really neat, go the way of Greece or Japan? That's kind of like going the way of Bernie Madoff or Warren Buffet. Greece's economy is being systematically destroyed by the conditions imposed by the European Central Bank and the I.M.F. It's unemployment rate is near 25 percent and virtually certain to go higher as virtually everyone projects at least another year of economic contraction. By contrast, the unemployment rate in Japan is just over 4.0 percent. While Greece is clearly a disaster, Japan's economy has done better in many respects than the U.S. economy over the last two decades. His next big whopper comes one paragraph down when Friedman tells readers: "This merger [of globalization and technology] makes old jobs obsolete faster and spins off new jobs faster, but all the good new jobs require higher skills." This is the structural unemployment story. This one can be easily disproved because none of the facts fit. There are no major sectors of the economy with rapidly rising wages, with longer workweeks and with large numbers of job openings relative to the number of unemployed. These are all characteristics of markets with labor shortages -- the jobs requiring higher skills story that Friedman is telling. It's a cute story, there's just no evidence for it.
It's always fun when Thomas Friedman writes a piece on economics. He likes to play a game with readers. He slips a number of false assertions into the column and readers are supposed to find them. (He probably does this with his columns on foreign policy also, but I don't have time to read through those columns.) Today's column is just chock full of these false assertions. Early on Friedman tells us: "many Americans understand something is very wrong, that we could go the way of Greece or Japan if we don’t shape up, and that they will embrace a candidate who trusts them with the truth, that is, an honest diagnosis of where we are and how we get out of this mess." That was really neat, go the way of Greece or Japan? That's kind of like going the way of Bernie Madoff or Warren Buffet. Greece's economy is being systematically destroyed by the conditions imposed by the European Central Bank and the I.M.F. It's unemployment rate is near 25 percent and virtually certain to go higher as virtually everyone projects at least another year of economic contraction. By contrast, the unemployment rate in Japan is just over 4.0 percent. While Greece is clearly a disaster, Japan's economy has done better in many respects than the U.S. economy over the last two decades. His next big whopper comes one paragraph down when Friedman tells readers: "This merger [of globalization and technology] makes old jobs obsolete faster and spins off new jobs faster, but all the good new jobs require higher skills." This is the structural unemployment story. This one can be easily disproved because none of the facts fit. There are no major sectors of the economy with rapidly rising wages, with longer workweeks and with large numbers of job openings relative to the number of unemployed. These are all characteristics of markets with labor shortages -- the jobs requiring higher skills story that Friedman is telling. It's a cute story, there's just no evidence for it.

That what people who saw this NPR Planet Money piece must be wondering. The problem is that the United States, as a result of its loss of manufacturing production, now has a large annual trade deficit of $600 billion or 4 percent of GDP. If were closer to full employment it would likely be around 5 percent of GDP, or $750 billion.

At the moment we are able to run these deficits because countries like China are willing to subsidize their exports to the U.S. by spending hundreds of billions of dollars every year to buy U.S. bonds and other assets. This keeps up the price of the dollar relative to their currencies, which makes their goods cheap for people in the United States.

While it is very generous of these countries to subsidize our consumption, it is unlikely they will do so forever. These subsidies keep up demand for their products in the United States, but they could also use the same money to subsidize the purchase of goods and services by their own people. This could lead to substantial improvements in the living standards of the people in the countries who are sustaining the over-valued dollar.

If these countries stopped propping up the dollar then the dollar would presumably fall to a level that it is roughly consistent with balanced trade. This would almost certainly mean a large increase in manufactured exports as well as increased domestic production to replace imports of manufactured goods. Roughly 70 percent of U.S. trade is in goods, and most of these goods involve some degree of manufacturing (as opposed to raw agricultural products or mining output).

It is difficult to imagine an adjustment to more balanced trade that doesn’t involve a large increase in production of U.S. manufactured goods. While our trade surplus on services can increase, it seems unlikely that it could go too far towards filling this gap. Also, it is not clear how many more people in the United States will want to work as housekeepers and table servers, since tourism is by far the largest category of service exports, accounting for more than a quarter of the total (travel plus passenger fares).

If we moved to balanced trade and manufacturing adjusted in accordance to its share of total trade, it would imply an increase in manufacturing output of close to 30 percent. Unless we have extraordinary gains in productivity, this would mean considerably more employment in the sector.

That what people who saw this NPR Planet Money piece must be wondering. The problem is that the United States, as a result of its loss of manufacturing production, now has a large annual trade deficit of $600 billion or 4 percent of GDP. If were closer to full employment it would likely be around 5 percent of GDP, or $750 billion.

At the moment we are able to run these deficits because countries like China are willing to subsidize their exports to the U.S. by spending hundreds of billions of dollars every year to buy U.S. bonds and other assets. This keeps up the price of the dollar relative to their currencies, which makes their goods cheap for people in the United States.

While it is very generous of these countries to subsidize our consumption, it is unlikely they will do so forever. These subsidies keep up demand for their products in the United States, but they could also use the same money to subsidize the purchase of goods and services by their own people. This could lead to substantial improvements in the living standards of the people in the countries who are sustaining the over-valued dollar.

If these countries stopped propping up the dollar then the dollar would presumably fall to a level that it is roughly consistent with balanced trade. This would almost certainly mean a large increase in manufactured exports as well as increased domestic production to replace imports of manufactured goods. Roughly 70 percent of U.S. trade is in goods, and most of these goods involve some degree of manufacturing (as opposed to raw agricultural products or mining output).

It is difficult to imagine an adjustment to more balanced trade that doesn’t involve a large increase in production of U.S. manufactured goods. While our trade surplus on services can increase, it seems unlikely that it could go too far towards filling this gap. Also, it is not clear how many more people in the United States will want to work as housekeepers and table servers, since tourism is by far the largest category of service exports, accounting for more than a quarter of the total (travel plus passenger fares).

If we moved to balanced trade and manufacturing adjusted in accordance to its share of total trade, it would imply an increase in manufacturing output of close to 30 percent. Unless we have extraordinary gains in productivity, this would mean considerably more employment in the sector.

Andrew Ross Sorkin uses his column today to highlight the troubles of those suffering the most from the downturn: the CEOs of major banks who bought up failing competitors in the midst of the financial crisis. Jamie Dimon, J.P. Morgan’s CEO, get center stage for having to deal with Bear Stearns’ legal liabilities, but Sorkin also has some tears for Wells Fargo, which bought up Wachovia, and Bank of America, which took over Merrill Lynch.

While Sorkin apparently feels sorry for the burdens imposed on these banks and their bosses, those of us who are less sentimental might remember that these are people who all draw 8 figure paychecks. They are supposed to know what they are doing. For example, Sorkin presents Dimon’s perspective:

“Mr. Dimon is clearly frustrated. Had Bear Stearns filed for bankruptcy, he said, there ‘would be no money. There would be no lawsuits. There would be no stock-drop lawsuits, there would be no class actions, there would be no mortgage lawsuits because there would be no money. But we bought it.’ ….

“‘When the government helped save General Motors by providing money and guarantees as part of its bankruptcy, ‘they absolved G.M. of all prior legal liability,’ Mr. Dimon said in an earnings conference call with investors and analysts on Friday. ‘So the government’s being a little inconsistent here.'”

Actually, there is no inconsistency here whatsoever. Mr. Dimon negotiated the terms under which he took over Bear Stearns. He did not arrange for a bankruptcy of the latter or some other measure that would have absolved J.P. Morgan from the companies’ legal liabilities. Presumably Dimon understood this fact at the time of the takeover, as did the CEOs of the other banks.

If CEOs of our largest banks do not understand such simple concepts perhaps the remedy is remedial education. Maybe we should require CEOs of banks with more than $500 billion in assets to take course on legal liabilities for acquired companies. Or, perhaps they need the equivalent of a Consumer Financial Products Protection Bureau which will ensure that they do not stumble into deals that turn out to be bad for them.

One last point that is worth remembering. Had it not been for the special assistance provided by the Fed, the Treasury, and the FDIC at the peak of the financial crisis, it is likely that all of the major Wall Street bank CEOs would be among the nation’s unemployed today. It is understandable that they would want more from the government (“job creators” always do), but it can be a bit difficult for those who are less sentimental than Mr. Sorkin to take their whining seriously. 

Andrew Ross Sorkin uses his column today to highlight the troubles of those suffering the most from the downturn: the CEOs of major banks who bought up failing competitors in the midst of the financial crisis. Jamie Dimon, J.P. Morgan’s CEO, get center stage for having to deal with Bear Stearns’ legal liabilities, but Sorkin also has some tears for Wells Fargo, which bought up Wachovia, and Bank of America, which took over Merrill Lynch.

While Sorkin apparently feels sorry for the burdens imposed on these banks and their bosses, those of us who are less sentimental might remember that these are people who all draw 8 figure paychecks. They are supposed to know what they are doing. For example, Sorkin presents Dimon’s perspective:

“Mr. Dimon is clearly frustrated. Had Bear Stearns filed for bankruptcy, he said, there ‘would be no money. There would be no lawsuits. There would be no stock-drop lawsuits, there would be no class actions, there would be no mortgage lawsuits because there would be no money. But we bought it.’ ….

“‘When the government helped save General Motors by providing money and guarantees as part of its bankruptcy, ‘they absolved G.M. of all prior legal liability,’ Mr. Dimon said in an earnings conference call with investors and analysts on Friday. ‘So the government’s being a little inconsistent here.'”

Actually, there is no inconsistency here whatsoever. Mr. Dimon negotiated the terms under which he took over Bear Stearns. He did not arrange for a bankruptcy of the latter or some other measure that would have absolved J.P. Morgan from the companies’ legal liabilities. Presumably Dimon understood this fact at the time of the takeover, as did the CEOs of the other banks.

If CEOs of our largest banks do not understand such simple concepts perhaps the remedy is remedial education. Maybe we should require CEOs of banks with more than $500 billion in assets to take course on legal liabilities for acquired companies. Or, perhaps they need the equivalent of a Consumer Financial Products Protection Bureau which will ensure that they do not stumble into deals that turn out to be bad for them.

One last point that is worth remembering. Had it not been for the special assistance provided by the Fed, the Treasury, and the FDIC at the peak of the financial crisis, it is likely that all of the major Wall Street bank CEOs would be among the nation’s unemployed today. It is understandable that they would want more from the government (“job creators” always do), but it can be a bit difficult for those who are less sentimental than Mr. Sorkin to take their whining seriously. 

Yes, that is absurd and even offensive, but since the NYT is going in for gross exaggeration to scare its readers about the budget, I thought I would play along. A NYT piece on the budget deficit told readers that:

“But even if Democrats and the financial markets go along with the delay [a decision to put off any longer term plans on taxes and spending if Romney wins the election], the months before Mr. Romney’s swearing-in could be as crucial to his presidency as the transition period was for Mr. Obama four years ago, when the economic crisis led him to draft a big stimulus package while President George W. Bush still occupied the White House.”

This is wrong. The economy was losing 700,000 jobs a month in the period between the election and when President Obama took office. His decision to push a stimulus, which in the context should not be called “big,” kept several million more people from losing their job. His decision shortly after the passage of the stimulus to “pivot to deficit reduction,” has likely ensured that millions of people will be needlessly unemployed for much of a decade.

It is difficult to imagine the set of events in a transition to a Romney administration that could have anywhere near the same consequence.

Yes, that is absurd and even offensive, but since the NYT is going in for gross exaggeration to scare its readers about the budget, I thought I would play along. A NYT piece on the budget deficit told readers that:

“But even if Democrats and the financial markets go along with the delay [a decision to put off any longer term plans on taxes and spending if Romney wins the election], the months before Mr. Romney’s swearing-in could be as crucial to his presidency as the transition period was for Mr. Obama four years ago, when the economic crisis led him to draft a big stimulus package while President George W. Bush still occupied the White House.”

This is wrong. The economy was losing 700,000 jobs a month in the period between the election and when President Obama took office. His decision to push a stimulus, which in the context should not be called “big,” kept several million more people from losing their job. His decision shortly after the passage of the stimulus to “pivot to deficit reduction,” has likely ensured that millions of people will be needlessly unemployed for much of a decade.

It is difficult to imagine the set of events in a transition to a Romney administration that could have anywhere near the same consequence.

Thomas Edsall’s Productivity Fears

In his NYT blog, Thomas Edsall took off from a recent paper by Northwestern University economist Robert Gordon and warned that we may see a future of very slow economic growth. While Gordon is a good economist, with many useful insights (including in this paper), it is worth throwing in a few words of caution. First, economists’ ability to predict trends in productivity is virtually zero. There were two major shifts in productivity trends in the post-World War II period: the slowdown that began in 1973 and the speedup that began in 1995. Almost no one saw either shift coming even as the shifts were occurring, much less 3 or 5 years ahead of time. Forty years later there is still no agreement within the economics profession on the causes of the slowdown in 1973. Given this history, it is reasonable to view any projections of productivity growth for the next hundred years and beyond with more than a little skepticism. With this caution, let me suggest some reasons that Gordon may be overly pessimistic. There are good reasons for believing that we could have large gains in living standards, even if these may not always be picked up in our GDP or productivity measures. To start with an easy one, we spend more than 17 percent of GDP on health care, more than twice as much per person as the average for other wealthy countries. Yet, we have nothing obvious to show for it in the way of outcomes. This suggests two obvious paths for gains. First, we can look to get our costs more in line with those of other wealthy countries. This would free up an enormous amount of resources for other uses. If the political system is too corrupt to allow for increased efficiency in the health care sector, we can look to take advantage of the more efficient systems elsewhere through increased trade. We could also look to have the sort of improvements in lifestyle and diet that would bring our life expectancies up to those of other wealthy country. We are currently more than 5 years behind Japan, the leader among major countries. If we could get even with Japan, somewhere over the course of the century, this extra 5 years, beyond the current path of increase, would be worth more than $250,000 per person by standard measures. A relatively simple way in which we could have an increase in living standards that would not be picked up GDP or productivity measures is by reducing the standard workweek to four days from five. If we assume that people spend an average of 1 hour on their round-trip commute, this would be an increase in pay per-hour spent working/commuting of more than 2 percent. If we also could stagger workdays and reduce congestion, the gains would be correspondingly larger.
In his NYT blog, Thomas Edsall took off from a recent paper by Northwestern University economist Robert Gordon and warned that we may see a future of very slow economic growth. While Gordon is a good economist, with many useful insights (including in this paper), it is worth throwing in a few words of caution. First, economists’ ability to predict trends in productivity is virtually zero. There were two major shifts in productivity trends in the post-World War II period: the slowdown that began in 1973 and the speedup that began in 1995. Almost no one saw either shift coming even as the shifts were occurring, much less 3 or 5 years ahead of time. Forty years later there is still no agreement within the economics profession on the causes of the slowdown in 1973. Given this history, it is reasonable to view any projections of productivity growth for the next hundred years and beyond with more than a little skepticism. With this caution, let me suggest some reasons that Gordon may be overly pessimistic. There are good reasons for believing that we could have large gains in living standards, even if these may not always be picked up in our GDP or productivity measures. To start with an easy one, we spend more than 17 percent of GDP on health care, more than twice as much per person as the average for other wealthy countries. Yet, we have nothing obvious to show for it in the way of outcomes. This suggests two obvious paths for gains. First, we can look to get our costs more in line with those of other wealthy countries. This would free up an enormous amount of resources for other uses. If the political system is too corrupt to allow for increased efficiency in the health care sector, we can look to take advantage of the more efficient systems elsewhere through increased trade. We could also look to have the sort of improvements in lifestyle and diet that would bring our life expectancies up to those of other wealthy country. We are currently more than 5 years behind Japan, the leader among major countries. If we could get even with Japan, somewhere over the course of the century, this extra 5 years, beyond the current path of increase, would be worth more than $250,000 per person by standard measures. A relatively simple way in which we could have an increase in living standards that would not be picked up GDP or productivity measures is by reducing the standard workweek to four days from five. If we assume that people spend an average of 1 hour on their round-trip commute, this would be an increase in pay per-hour spent working/commuting of more than 2 percent. If we also could stagger workdays and reduce congestion, the gains would be correspondingly larger.

Tax Deductible Speeding Tickets?

I wouldn’t try taking the deduction, but apparently banks and other corporate crooks are often able to deduct the settlements in civil actions from their taxes. Good piece in the Post calling attention to this issue.

I wouldn’t try taking the deduction, but apparently banks and other corporate crooks are often able to deduct the settlements in civil actions from their taxes. Good piece in the Post calling attention to this issue.

After having provoked a debate that subsequently involved Nick Rowe, Brad DeLong and Paul Krugman, I will assert blog owners’ privilege and throw out some summary thoughts. First, we all seem to agree that in a situation where the economy is clearly operating well below its potential, governments can run deficits to boost employment and output. I believe we all agree that in principle the government can also use these deficits to increase future output through productive investment in either physical or human capital. This would make future generations better off on net as a result of deficits today, since the economy will be larger than it would be without the deficits. I would also add, without necessarily implicating anyone else, that simply by increasing output and employment the government is likely to make society better off in the future for two reasons. First, by keeping people employed we will keep them attached to the labor force and reduce the number of hard core unemployed who would be difficult to re-employ in subsequent years, possibly leaving us with a higher rate of unemployment (and lower output) long into the future. The other reason that short-term increases in employment can have long-term effects is that by keeping families intact, children are likely to have better upbringings and do better in school. This means that the next generation will on average will have happier more productive lives because we used deficits to keep their parents employed today. Okay, but even if deficits today don’t reduce output tomorrow, Nick Rowe argues that by increasing the wealth of some members of the current generation (those who hold the bonds used to finance the deficit), we can still be reducing the wealth of members of future generations. The argument here is that if we get back to full employment at some point in the future (this is a full employment argument), the people who hold the bonds will be able to pull resources away from young people who are entering the labor force and were not involved in the decision to run deficits today. There is some validity to this point, but it is extremely limited. First, it is important to remember that most of the holders of current debt will be people who have children and/or will bequest some of their wealth to their children or charitable organizations. While children may not benefit one to one from the consumption of their parents, surely they benefit in part. Insofar as people with or without children save some of the wealth from the bonds and subsequently will it to children or charitable organizations, today’s deficit will not crowd out any consumption of future generations. Finally, much of the tax burden of paying the debt service on the debt issued today will be borne by members of the current generation. In that sense it is an issue of intra-generational distribution, not intergenerational distribution. In short, we can talk about some burden on future generations as a result of debt issued today, if it goes to unproductive uses, but the size of this burden is clearly a fraction of the debt and likely to be a very small fraction in my book. Furthermore, debt is far from the only mechanism through which the government imposes inter-generational burdens of this type.
After having provoked a debate that subsequently involved Nick Rowe, Brad DeLong and Paul Krugman, I will assert blog owners’ privilege and throw out some summary thoughts. First, we all seem to agree that in a situation where the economy is clearly operating well below its potential, governments can run deficits to boost employment and output. I believe we all agree that in principle the government can also use these deficits to increase future output through productive investment in either physical or human capital. This would make future generations better off on net as a result of deficits today, since the economy will be larger than it would be without the deficits. I would also add, without necessarily implicating anyone else, that simply by increasing output and employment the government is likely to make society better off in the future for two reasons. First, by keeping people employed we will keep them attached to the labor force and reduce the number of hard core unemployed who would be difficult to re-employ in subsequent years, possibly leaving us with a higher rate of unemployment (and lower output) long into the future. The other reason that short-term increases in employment can have long-term effects is that by keeping families intact, children are likely to have better upbringings and do better in school. This means that the next generation will on average will have happier more productive lives because we used deficits to keep their parents employed today. Okay, but even if deficits today don’t reduce output tomorrow, Nick Rowe argues that by increasing the wealth of some members of the current generation (those who hold the bonds used to finance the deficit), we can still be reducing the wealth of members of future generations. The argument here is that if we get back to full employment at some point in the future (this is a full employment argument), the people who hold the bonds will be able to pull resources away from young people who are entering the labor force and were not involved in the decision to run deficits today. There is some validity to this point, but it is extremely limited. First, it is important to remember that most of the holders of current debt will be people who have children and/or will bequest some of their wealth to their children or charitable organizations. While children may not benefit one to one from the consumption of their parents, surely they benefit in part. Insofar as people with or without children save some of the wealth from the bonds and subsequently will it to children or charitable organizations, today’s deficit will not crowd out any consumption of future generations. Finally, much of the tax burden of paying the debt service on the debt issued today will be borne by members of the current generation. In that sense it is an issue of intra-generational distribution, not intergenerational distribution. In short, we can talk about some burden on future generations as a result of debt issued today, if it goes to unproductive uses, but the size of this burden is clearly a fraction of the debt and likely to be a very small fraction in my book. Furthermore, debt is far from the only mechanism through which the government imposes inter-generational burdens of this type.

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