Beat the Press

Beat the press por Dean Baker

Beat the Press is Dean Baker's commentary on economic reporting. He is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). To never miss a post, subscribe to a weekly email roundup of Beat the Press. Please also consider supporting the blog on Patreon.

The Washington Post had a front page piece today warning that the spread of robots in the workplace may displace large numbers of workers. Incredibly, the piece never once mentions the implication of the displacement story for the demographic nightmare stories that endlessly fill its news and opinion pages.

Remember, the demographic nightmare story is that because of lower birth rates and longer life expectancies we are going to see a fall in the ratio of workers to retirees, from 3 to 1 today, to just 2 to 1 in 20 years. So, this is a story where we are suffering from a severe labor shortage. All of us aging baby boomers will be laying in our own waste because there is no one to change our bedpans.

Okay, now we have the story of sophisticated robots that will be able to replace human laborers in a wide variety of activities. The Post tells us that we should be worried about unemployment. Not really, because anyone who has read an intro econ textbook in the last 70 years knows that creating demand in an economy is very simple. Governments can run deficits. And if we need lots of demand, then we can run large deficits.

These deficits will give us the money we need to buy the output generated by sophisticated robots. And, when it is necessary, we will have the sophisticated robots changing our bedpans.

Of course there is a political problem. Folks like Peter Peterson and Washington Post don’t want us to run deficits. They would rather see workers be unemployed. But hey, this is not the fault of the robots.

Advanced robots are simply another form of the productivity growth that we should all know and love. It increases the potential wealth of society. It is certainly possible that the rich and powerful will use their control over the political process to deny the bulk of the population the benefits of productivity growth, as they have largely done for the last 30 years, but the blame should be focused on the rich and powerful, not the robots. You might as well lash out at the wheel.

The Washington Post had a front page piece today warning that the spread of robots in the workplace may displace large numbers of workers. Incredibly, the piece never once mentions the implication of the displacement story for the demographic nightmare stories that endlessly fill its news and opinion pages.

Remember, the demographic nightmare story is that because of lower birth rates and longer life expectancies we are going to see a fall in the ratio of workers to retirees, from 3 to 1 today, to just 2 to 1 in 20 years. So, this is a story where we are suffering from a severe labor shortage. All of us aging baby boomers will be laying in our own waste because there is no one to change our bedpans.

Okay, now we have the story of sophisticated robots that will be able to replace human laborers in a wide variety of activities. The Post tells us that we should be worried about unemployment. Not really, because anyone who has read an intro econ textbook in the last 70 years knows that creating demand in an economy is very simple. Governments can run deficits. And if we need lots of demand, then we can run large deficits.

These deficits will give us the money we need to buy the output generated by sophisticated robots. And, when it is necessary, we will have the sophisticated robots changing our bedpans.

Of course there is a political problem. Folks like Peter Peterson and Washington Post don’t want us to run deficits. They would rather see workers be unemployed. But hey, this is not the fault of the robots.

Advanced robots are simply another form of the productivity growth that we should all know and love. It increases the potential wealth of society. It is certainly possible that the rich and powerful will use their control over the political process to deny the bulk of the population the benefits of productivity growth, as they have largely done for the last 30 years, but the blame should be focused on the rich and powerful, not the robots. You might as well lash out at the wheel.

The most striking feature of the U.S. economy over the last three decades has been the upward redistribution of income. The top 1.0 percent of households has managed to pocket the vast majority of gains over this period. That is a sharp contrast with the three decades immediately following World War II when the benefits of much more rapid growth were broadly shared. This pattern of growth might lead people to question the policies that have led to this upward redistribution (e.g. trade policy, labor policy, monetary policy, and anti-trust policy). In order to prevent such questioning and to further the process of upward redistribution many wealthy people have sought to focus public attention on programs that benefit the middle class and/or poor. Peter Peterson, the Wall Street investment banker, has been most visible in this effort, committing over $1 billion of his fortune for this purpose. Recently he enlisted a group of CEOs in his organization, Fix the Debt, which quite explicitly hopes to divert concerns over income inequality into concerns over generational inequality. It argues that programs like Social Security and Medicare, whose direct beneficiaries are disproportionately elderly, are taking resources from the young. It is easy to show the absurdity of this position. The amount of money that the young stand to lose from the upward redistribution of income is an order of magnitude larger than whatever hit to their after-tax income they might face due to the continuing drop in the ratio of workers to retirees. Also, older people generally have families. This means that when we cut the Social Security or Medicare benefits of middle and lower income beneficiaries, we are often creating a gap that will be filled from the income of their children. Nonetheless, when you have a billion dollars to throw around, you will have plenty of people willing to argue absurd positions. Therefore, it is not surprising to see the Fix the Debt crew and various other Peterson derivative organizations pushing the line about generational conflict, but what is NPR's excuse?
The most striking feature of the U.S. economy over the last three decades has been the upward redistribution of income. The top 1.0 percent of households has managed to pocket the vast majority of gains over this period. That is a sharp contrast with the three decades immediately following World War II when the benefits of much more rapid growth were broadly shared. This pattern of growth might lead people to question the policies that have led to this upward redistribution (e.g. trade policy, labor policy, monetary policy, and anti-trust policy). In order to prevent such questioning and to further the process of upward redistribution many wealthy people have sought to focus public attention on programs that benefit the middle class and/or poor. Peter Peterson, the Wall Street investment banker, has been most visible in this effort, committing over $1 billion of his fortune for this purpose. Recently he enlisted a group of CEOs in his organization, Fix the Debt, which quite explicitly hopes to divert concerns over income inequality into concerns over generational inequality. It argues that programs like Social Security and Medicare, whose direct beneficiaries are disproportionately elderly, are taking resources from the young. It is easy to show the absurdity of this position. The amount of money that the young stand to lose from the upward redistribution of income is an order of magnitude larger than whatever hit to their after-tax income they might face due to the continuing drop in the ratio of workers to retirees. Also, older people generally have families. This means that when we cut the Social Security or Medicare benefits of middle and lower income beneficiaries, we are often creating a gap that will be filled from the income of their children. Nonetheless, when you have a billion dollars to throw around, you will have plenty of people willing to argue absurd positions. Therefore, it is not surprising to see the Fix the Debt crew and various other Peterson derivative organizations pushing the line about generational conflict, but what is NPR's excuse?

As its readers know, the Washington Post really really wants to see big cuts in Medicare and Social Security and is happy to use its news pages to advance this agenda. In a budget piece today, it told readers:

“In a flurry of meetings and phone calls over the past few days, Obama has courted more than half a dozen Republicans in the Senate, telling them that he is ready to overhaul expensive health and retirement programs if they agree to raise taxes to tame the national debt” [emphasis added].

If the Post was not trying to push its Big Deal agenda, it would have told readers that Obama is willing to cut health care retirement programs. The issue here is reducing government payments, not changing the color of the forms used. It also would not use the adjective “expensive.” While the country does pay a lot of money for Medicare and Medicaid, because it pays doctors and other providers much more than they get elsewhere, Social Security is actually relatively cheap compared to other countries’ public pension programs.

Also, an objective newspaper would not have inserted the word “tame” since the data do not support the case that the debt is somehow out of control. The ratio of debt to GDP has been rising only because the collapse of the housing bubble led to a severe downturn. Had it not been for this downturn, the ratio would have fallen through most of the decade. The ratio of interest to GDP is near a post-war low.

The piece also asserts that:

“there was more skepticism of Obama’s motives”

among many Republicans. Of course the Post does not know whether Republicans really were skeptical of President Obama’s motives, they just know that Republicans claimed to be skeptical. It is not good reporting to accept assertions from politicians at face value, since they are not always truthful. 

As its readers know, the Washington Post really really wants to see big cuts in Medicare and Social Security and is happy to use its news pages to advance this agenda. In a budget piece today, it told readers:

“In a flurry of meetings and phone calls over the past few days, Obama has courted more than half a dozen Republicans in the Senate, telling them that he is ready to overhaul expensive health and retirement programs if they agree to raise taxes to tame the national debt” [emphasis added].

If the Post was not trying to push its Big Deal agenda, it would have told readers that Obama is willing to cut health care retirement programs. The issue here is reducing government payments, not changing the color of the forms used. It also would not use the adjective “expensive.” While the country does pay a lot of money for Medicare and Medicaid, because it pays doctors and other providers much more than they get elsewhere, Social Security is actually relatively cheap compared to other countries’ public pension programs.

Also, an objective newspaper would not have inserted the word “tame” since the data do not support the case that the debt is somehow out of control. The ratio of debt to GDP has been rising only because the collapse of the housing bubble led to a severe downturn. Had it not been for this downturn, the ratio would have fallen through most of the decade. The ratio of interest to GDP is near a post-war low.

The piece also asserts that:

“there was more skepticism of Obama’s motives”

among many Republicans. Of course the Post does not know whether Republicans really were skeptical of President Obama’s motives, they just know that Republicans claimed to be skeptical. It is not good reporting to accept assertions from politicians at face value, since they are not always truthful. 

I see that Brad has a post saying that the economy was adjusting nicely to the bursting of the housing bubble until the financial crisis set in. He notes that housing construction fell by 2.5 percentage points of GDP between 2005 and 2008. This was replaced by an increase in gross exports of 2.0 pp of GDP and increase in equipment investment of 0.5 pp. Everything was moving along nicely until the financial crisis in 2008.

I see things a bit differently. First, gross exports don’t create jobs, net exports do. When we move an auto assembly plant from Ohio to Mexico, we are not creating additional jobs with the car parts exported to Mexico. That’s intro textbook stuff. If we look at the net export picture, the gain is only about 1 pp of GDP. Furthermore, it is hard to see the improvement in the trade picture having gone very much further without a further decline in the dollar. (That was a possibility, but far from a certainty — it depends on policy decisions elsewhere.)

The rest of the gap was made up by a surge in non-residential construction (can you say bubble?), which rose by more than 33 percent as a share of GDP, or more than 1 pp of GDP. This boom led to considerable overbuilding in retail, office space and most other categories of non-residential construction. Assuming the burst of spending in non-residential construction was another bubble, then the portion of the demand gap filled through this channel was destined to be temporary. It was inevitable that this bubble would also burst and we would need something else to make up the hole in demand.

The other factor in the mix is the drop off in consumption. Savings rates had been driven to nearly zero by the wealth created by the housing bubble. It seems to me inevitable that consumption would fall in response to the disappearance of this wealth. The financial crisis gave us a Wily E. Coyote moment where everyone stopped spending at the same time, but I would argue that this just brought the decline in spending forward in time.

The savings rate remains much higher today than at the peak of the bubble, although still low by historic standards. (It’s currently around 4.0 percent, the pre-bubble average was over 8.0 percent.) We have two alternative hypotheses here. I gather Brad would say that people are spending at a lower rate because they are still freaked out by the financial crisis. I would argue that they are spending at a lower rate for the same reason that homeless people don’t spend, they don’t have the money.

Homeowners are down $8 trillion in housing equity as a result of the crash. I would expect that loss of wealth to have a substantial impact on their spending. I gather Brad does not.

[Correction: The earlier version said “net exports” in the first paragraph.]

I see that Brad has a post saying that the economy was adjusting nicely to the bursting of the housing bubble until the financial crisis set in. He notes that housing construction fell by 2.5 percentage points of GDP between 2005 and 2008. This was replaced by an increase in gross exports of 2.0 pp of GDP and increase in equipment investment of 0.5 pp. Everything was moving along nicely until the financial crisis in 2008.

I see things a bit differently. First, gross exports don’t create jobs, net exports do. When we move an auto assembly plant from Ohio to Mexico, we are not creating additional jobs with the car parts exported to Mexico. That’s intro textbook stuff. If we look at the net export picture, the gain is only about 1 pp of GDP. Furthermore, it is hard to see the improvement in the trade picture having gone very much further without a further decline in the dollar. (That was a possibility, but far from a certainty — it depends on policy decisions elsewhere.)

The rest of the gap was made up by a surge in non-residential construction (can you say bubble?), which rose by more than 33 percent as a share of GDP, or more than 1 pp of GDP. This boom led to considerable overbuilding in retail, office space and most other categories of non-residential construction. Assuming the burst of spending in non-residential construction was another bubble, then the portion of the demand gap filled through this channel was destined to be temporary. It was inevitable that this bubble would also burst and we would need something else to make up the hole in demand.

The other factor in the mix is the drop off in consumption. Savings rates had been driven to nearly zero by the wealth created by the housing bubble. It seems to me inevitable that consumption would fall in response to the disappearance of this wealth. The financial crisis gave us a Wily E. Coyote moment where everyone stopped spending at the same time, but I would argue that this just brought the decline in spending forward in time.

The savings rate remains much higher today than at the peak of the bubble, although still low by historic standards. (It’s currently around 4.0 percent, the pre-bubble average was over 8.0 percent.) We have two alternative hypotheses here. I gather Brad would say that people are spending at a lower rate because they are still freaked out by the financial crisis. I would argue that they are spending at a lower rate for the same reason that homeless people don’t spend, they don’t have the money.

Homeowners are down $8 trillion in housing equity as a result of the crash. I would expect that loss of wealth to have a substantial impact on their spending. I gather Brad does not.

[Correction: The earlier version said “net exports” in the first paragraph.]

The Federal Reserve Board disastrously missed and/or ignored two huge bubbles in the last decades: the stock bubble in the 1990s and the housing bubble in the 2000s. The collapse of both bubbles led to recessions from which it was difficult to recover. Neil Irwin inadvertently tells us today that the Fed is still utterly clueless when it comes to dealing with bubbles. The problem is that, at least according to Irwin's account, no one at the Fed seems to understand how bubbles hurt the economy. On the one hand, he presents the views of Fed governor Jeremy Stein, a bubble hawk, who he tells us: "argued in a Feb. 7 speech that there are already signs of overheating in the markets for certain kinds of securities, including junk bonds and real estate investment trusts that invest in mortgages. And if those or other potential bubbles get so large that if they popped the whole U.S. economy could be in danger." By contrast we have Fed chair Ben Bernanke and vice-chair Janet Yellen, the latter of whom he quotes as saying: "At this stage there are some signs that investors are reaching for yield, but I do not now see pervasive evidence of trends such as rapid credit growth, a marked buildup in leverage, or significant asset bubbles that would clearly threaten financial stability." Unfortunately, the concern about financial stability and discerning bubbles in a wide array of economic data completely misses the point. First, financial instability is not what caused our problems in either 2001 or in the current downturn. As much fun as it is to see the Fed chair, Treasury Secretary and other important people sweating over the collapse of huge financial institutions, this crisis was very much secondary to the country's economic problems. We know how to paper over a financial crisis, which the Fed eventually did (as did the European central bank), the hard part is replacing the demand that had been generated by a bubble once the bubble has burst. This directly leads to the second point. The bubbles that we have to worry about are not hard to find. Suppose there is a huge speculative bubble in soy beans that pushes their price to 20 times their normal level. This could be bad news for people that like soy beans and derivative products. It may also be disastrous for producers in the industry if they get caught on the wrong side of things. However, the collapse of this bubble will have minimal impact on the economy. If for some reason our bubble watchers at the Fed failed to notice the rise in soy bean prices, the problems caused by its eventual bursting will not sink the economy.
The Federal Reserve Board disastrously missed and/or ignored two huge bubbles in the last decades: the stock bubble in the 1990s and the housing bubble in the 2000s. The collapse of both bubbles led to recessions from which it was difficult to recover. Neil Irwin inadvertently tells us today that the Fed is still utterly clueless when it comes to dealing with bubbles. The problem is that, at least according to Irwin's account, no one at the Fed seems to understand how bubbles hurt the economy. On the one hand, he presents the views of Fed governor Jeremy Stein, a bubble hawk, who he tells us: "argued in a Feb. 7 speech that there are already signs of overheating in the markets for certain kinds of securities, including junk bonds and real estate investment trusts that invest in mortgages. And if those or other potential bubbles get so large that if they popped the whole U.S. economy could be in danger." By contrast we have Fed chair Ben Bernanke and vice-chair Janet Yellen, the latter of whom he quotes as saying: "At this stage there are some signs that investors are reaching for yield, but I do not now see pervasive evidence of trends such as rapid credit growth, a marked buildup in leverage, or significant asset bubbles that would clearly threaten financial stability." Unfortunately, the concern about financial stability and discerning bubbles in a wide array of economic data completely misses the point. First, financial instability is not what caused our problems in either 2001 or in the current downturn. As much fun as it is to see the Fed chair, Treasury Secretary and other important people sweating over the collapse of huge financial institutions, this crisis was very much secondary to the country's economic problems. We know how to paper over a financial crisis, which the Fed eventually did (as did the European central bank), the hard part is replacing the demand that had been generated by a bubble once the bubble has burst. This directly leads to the second point. The bubbles that we have to worry about are not hard to find. Suppose there is a huge speculative bubble in soy beans that pushes their price to 20 times their normal level. This could be bad news for people that like soy beans and derivative products. It may also be disastrous for producers in the industry if they get caught on the wrong side of things. However, the collapse of this bubble will have minimal impact on the economy. If for some reason our bubble watchers at the Fed failed to notice the rise in soy bean prices, the problems caused by its eventual bursting will not sink the economy.

It’s extremely unfair that shoe salespeople have to pay taxes on their income at the same rate as other workers. After all, they must work with shoe buyers, achieve an alignment of interest, and then get them to buy the shoes. Clearly this means that they should be taxed at the lower capital gains rate rather than the ordinary earnings rate that factory workers and school teachers pay.

Yes, this is nuts, but because very rich people run pension and hedge funds, the NYT feels the need to treat this stuff seriously. Therefore it gave Steve Judge, the chief executive of the Private Equity Growth Capital Council the opportunity to say that shoes salespeople shouldn’t have to be taxed at the same rate as everyone else. (Sorry, I meant rich equity and hedge fund managers.)

This one does not come close to passing the laugh test. The point here is very simple. When you get paid for work, whether you are school teacher, a shoe salesperson, or a hedge fund manager, this is earned income and should be taxed as such.

If hedge and private equity fund managers want to invest in their funds they are free to do so and can have their subsequent income taxed at the lower capital gains rate. This is really simple — even a hedge fund or private equity fund manager should be able to understand this. It is not a complicated issue no matter how much people may get paid to make it complicated.

 

Note: Typo corrected, thanks Tom.

It’s extremely unfair that shoe salespeople have to pay taxes on their income at the same rate as other workers. After all, they must work with shoe buyers, achieve an alignment of interest, and then get them to buy the shoes. Clearly this means that they should be taxed at the lower capital gains rate rather than the ordinary earnings rate that factory workers and school teachers pay.

Yes, this is nuts, but because very rich people run pension and hedge funds, the NYT feels the need to treat this stuff seriously. Therefore it gave Steve Judge, the chief executive of the Private Equity Growth Capital Council the opportunity to say that shoes salespeople shouldn’t have to be taxed at the same rate as everyone else. (Sorry, I meant rich equity and hedge fund managers.)

This one does not come close to passing the laugh test. The point here is very simple. When you get paid for work, whether you are school teacher, a shoe salesperson, or a hedge fund manager, this is earned income and should be taxed as such.

If hedge and private equity fund managers want to invest in their funds they are free to do so and can have their subsequent income taxed at the lower capital gains rate. This is really simple — even a hedge fund or private equity fund manager should be able to understand this. It is not a complicated issue no matter how much people may get paid to make it complicated.

 

Note: Typo corrected, thanks Tom.

That’s what readers of Marc Thiessen’s column on the sequester would conclude. Theissen repeatedly touts the report of the Bowles-Simpson commission. Of course there was no report issued by the commission because no report received the necessary majority. The Post’s fact checkers would have quickly caught Thiessen’s error and insist that he correct it, but such is the price of labor discord.

Thiessen’s piece is also striking for the lack of concern for the people will lose their jobs as a result of slower growth that is resulting from his preferred policy. Presumably he does not imagine himself or his friends to be among the people who will lose jobs because of the policies he advocates.

That’s what readers of Marc Thiessen’s column on the sequester would conclude. Theissen repeatedly touts the report of the Bowles-Simpson commission. Of course there was no report issued by the commission because no report received the necessary majority. The Post’s fact checkers would have quickly caught Thiessen’s error and insist that he correct it, but such is the price of labor discord.

Thiessen’s piece is also striking for the lack of concern for the people will lose their jobs as a result of slower growth that is resulting from his preferred policy. Presumably he does not imagine himself or his friends to be among the people who will lose jobs because of the policies he advocates.

The Washington Post began an article on a meeting of the euro zone finance ministers by telling readers:

“European leaders demanded that euro members press on with budget cuts to end the debt crisis.”

At this point there is overwhelming evidence that the primary effect of the austerity being demanded by the finance ministers is to slow growth and increase unemployment. As a result of the negative impact on output, the budget cuts lead to little improvement in the financial situation of the affected countries.

Since the evidence shows that the ministers’ austerity agenda is not an effective way to deal with the debt crisis it is wrong of the Post to tell readers that this is the motive of the finance ministers. This assertion assumes that the finance ministers have no clue about the actual effect of the policies they advocate. While this may in fact be true, the Post certainly cannot claim to know that the euro zone’s finance ministers are completely clueless about economics.

It would have been more accurate to simply report what the ministers claim, for example writing:

“European leaders demanded that euro members press on with budget cuts ‘to end the debt crisis.'”

This would made have made it clear to readers that the rationale claimed by the finance ministers bears no obvious relation to reality.

The Washington Post began an article on a meeting of the euro zone finance ministers by telling readers:

“European leaders demanded that euro members press on with budget cuts to end the debt crisis.”

At this point there is overwhelming evidence that the primary effect of the austerity being demanded by the finance ministers is to slow growth and increase unemployment. As a result of the negative impact on output, the budget cuts lead to little improvement in the financial situation of the affected countries.

Since the evidence shows that the ministers’ austerity agenda is not an effective way to deal with the debt crisis it is wrong of the Post to tell readers that this is the motive of the finance ministers. This assertion assumes that the finance ministers have no clue about the actual effect of the policies they advocate. While this may in fact be true, the Post certainly cannot claim to know that the euro zone’s finance ministers are completely clueless about economics.

It would have been more accurate to simply report what the ministers claim, for example writing:

“European leaders demanded that euro members press on with budget cuts ‘to end the debt crisis.'”

This would made have made it clear to readers that the rationale claimed by the finance ministers bears no obvious relation to reality.

The NYT yet again referred to a report of the Bowles-Simpson Commission. There is no report from the Bowles-Simpson Commission because no report received the support of the necessary majority.

All of the sources for this article indicate that they want to see cuts in Social Security and Medicare. This is a position that is opposed by the vast majority of people regardless of their political party or ideology. It would be useful if the NYT did not exclusively present the views of the minority who want to see cuts in these programs in its budget articles.

The NYT yet again referred to a report of the Bowles-Simpson Commission. There is no report from the Bowles-Simpson Commission because no report received the support of the necessary majority.

All of the sources for this article indicate that they want to see cuts in Social Security and Medicare. This is a position that is opposed by the vast majority of people regardless of their political party or ideology. It would be useful if the NYT did not exclusively present the views of the minority who want to see cuts in these programs in its budget articles.

I'm not kidding, it's right there in the Washington Post. And we thought Bob Woodward was creative. But Samuelson's economic history is even more striking than the linking of Kennedy to the sequester. He notes the fiscal stimulus that was sparked by the Kennedy tax cuts (and the Vietnam War and Johnson's Great Society programs) and the boom that resulted, and tells us that "it was a disaster." "High inflation was the first shock. An initial boom (by 1969, unemployment was 3.5 percent) spawned a wage-price spiral. With government seeming to guarantee 4 percent unemployment, workers and businesses had little reason to restrain wages and prices. In 1960, inflation was 1 percent; by 1980, it was 13 percent. The economy became less stable. From 1969 to 1982, there were four recessions, as the Federal Reserve alternated between trying to push unemployment down and prevent inflation from going up. Only in the early 1980s did the Fed, under Paul Volcker and with Ronald Reagan’s support, crush inflationary psychology." Before looking at Samuelson's horror story here, it is worth noting what happened in the boom, which can be treated as going through 1973, in spite of the recession in 1969. Growth over the 10 years from 1963 to 1973 averaged 4.4 percent, by far the most rapid stretch in the post-World War II era. The unemployment rate hovered near 4.0 percent for most of this period, as Samuelson complains. This led to large gains in real wages and sharp declines in poverty. The overall poverty rate fell from 19.5 percent in 1963 percent to 11.1 percent in 1973, an all-time low. For African Americans the poverty rate fell from 55.1 percent in 1959 (annual data is not available) to 31.4 percent in 1973. I suspect most folks wouldn't mind a few more disasters like this one.
I'm not kidding, it's right there in the Washington Post. And we thought Bob Woodward was creative. But Samuelson's economic history is even more striking than the linking of Kennedy to the sequester. He notes the fiscal stimulus that was sparked by the Kennedy tax cuts (and the Vietnam War and Johnson's Great Society programs) and the boom that resulted, and tells us that "it was a disaster." "High inflation was the first shock. An initial boom (by 1969, unemployment was 3.5 percent) spawned a wage-price spiral. With government seeming to guarantee 4 percent unemployment, workers and businesses had little reason to restrain wages and prices. In 1960, inflation was 1 percent; by 1980, it was 13 percent. The economy became less stable. From 1969 to 1982, there were four recessions, as the Federal Reserve alternated between trying to push unemployment down and prevent inflation from going up. Only in the early 1980s did the Fed, under Paul Volcker and with Ronald Reagan’s support, crush inflationary psychology." Before looking at Samuelson's horror story here, it is worth noting what happened in the boom, which can be treated as going through 1973, in spite of the recession in 1969. Growth over the 10 years from 1963 to 1973 averaged 4.4 percent, by far the most rapid stretch in the post-World War II era. The unemployment rate hovered near 4.0 percent for most of this period, as Samuelson complains. This led to large gains in real wages and sharp declines in poverty. The overall poverty rate fell from 19.5 percent in 1963 percent to 11.1 percent in 1973, an all-time low. For African Americans the poverty rate fell from 55.1 percent in 1959 (annual data is not available) to 31.4 percent in 1973. I suspect most folks wouldn't mind a few more disasters like this one.

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