Charles Lane gets the story on homeownership at least partly right in his Washington Post column today. It is not necessarily bad that fewer people are homeowners, if the drop is due to people with very little equity in serious danger of losing their home. It is also worth adding that in an economy where few people can count on stable employment, homeownership is not necessarily a plus, since it can make it more difficult for unemployed workers to move to areas with more jobs.
However Lane gets a few other things badly wrong. He gives readers the happy news on home equity:
“Contrary to entrenched conventional wisdom, however, the ongoing decline of the homeownership rate is actually good news.
“Here’s why: Thanks to recovering real estate values, today’s homeowners as a group have the same equity in their property — roughly 58 percent — that the record-size cohort did back in late 2004, according to the Federal Reserve. Ergo, there’s now more equity, on a per- household basis; current homeowners’ tenure is that much more sustainable and secure.”
This is misleading both because it relies on averages, thereby ignoring distribution, and also 2004 was in fact a really bad year for home equity. If we look at medians, and adjust for age (an important factor in an aging population), the situation does not look so happy.
According to the Federal Reserve Board’s 2013 Survey of Consumer Finance, the most recent one available, the median homeowner between the age of 55 to 64 had an equity stake equal to $54,600. That’s down from $71,000 in 2001 and $81,000 in 1989 (all numbers in 2013 dollars). For those between the ages of 45–54, median equity stake was just $35,900, compares to $52,100 in 2001 and $72,200 in 1989. In the 35–44 age group median equity was $23,200 in 2013, $43,800 in 2001, and $63,500 in 1989.
All these numbers are made worse by the fact that the homeownership rate within each age group was considerably lower in 2013 than in prior years. This means that the median homeowner was considerably higher up in the overall distribution of income in 2013 than in the comparison years. It is also worth noting that people have less wealth outside of their home as well, indicating that they have not opted to invest elsewhere as an alternative to homeownership.
The other item on which Lane misleads readers is the comparison to European countries where the homeownership rate is considerably lower. These countries have much stronger rules protecting renters from eviction and excessive rent increases. This makes their renters much more secure relative to renters in the United States. Given the lack of protection for renters in most areas in the United States, it is understandable that many would see homeownership as the only way to have secure housing.
In any case, Lane is right that it is not necessarily a bad thing that fewer people are shelling out large amounts of money in realtor fees and closing costs on homes that they are unable to keep. Unfortunately, this does not appear to be because people have decided that renting is a better option.
Charles Lane gets the story on homeownership at least partly right in his Washington Post column today. It is not necessarily bad that fewer people are homeowners, if the drop is due to people with very little equity in serious danger of losing their home. It is also worth adding that in an economy where few people can count on stable employment, homeownership is not necessarily a plus, since it can make it more difficult for unemployed workers to move to areas with more jobs.
However Lane gets a few other things badly wrong. He gives readers the happy news on home equity:
“Contrary to entrenched conventional wisdom, however, the ongoing decline of the homeownership rate is actually good news.
“Here’s why: Thanks to recovering real estate values, today’s homeowners as a group have the same equity in their property — roughly 58 percent — that the record-size cohort did back in late 2004, according to the Federal Reserve. Ergo, there’s now more equity, on a per- household basis; current homeowners’ tenure is that much more sustainable and secure.”
This is misleading both because it relies on averages, thereby ignoring distribution, and also 2004 was in fact a really bad year for home equity. If we look at medians, and adjust for age (an important factor in an aging population), the situation does not look so happy.
According to the Federal Reserve Board’s 2013 Survey of Consumer Finance, the most recent one available, the median homeowner between the age of 55 to 64 had an equity stake equal to $54,600. That’s down from $71,000 in 2001 and $81,000 in 1989 (all numbers in 2013 dollars). For those between the ages of 45–54, median equity stake was just $35,900, compares to $52,100 in 2001 and $72,200 in 1989. In the 35–44 age group median equity was $23,200 in 2013, $43,800 in 2001, and $63,500 in 1989.
All these numbers are made worse by the fact that the homeownership rate within each age group was considerably lower in 2013 than in prior years. This means that the median homeowner was considerably higher up in the overall distribution of income in 2013 than in the comparison years. It is also worth noting that people have less wealth outside of their home as well, indicating that they have not opted to invest elsewhere as an alternative to homeownership.
The other item on which Lane misleads readers is the comparison to European countries where the homeownership rate is considerably lower. These countries have much stronger rules protecting renters from eviction and excessive rent increases. This makes their renters much more secure relative to renters in the United States. Given the lack of protection for renters in most areas in the United States, it is understandable that many would see homeownership as the only way to have secure housing.
In any case, Lane is right that it is not necessarily a bad thing that fewer people are shelling out large amounts of money in realtor fees and closing costs on homes that they are unable to keep. Unfortunately, this does not appear to be because people have decided that renting is a better option.
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I probably shouldn’t make too much of a deal about the edging lower part, after all, we’re just talking a few hundredths of a percentage point, but the real issue is that the inflation rate is not edging higher. The Fed has a target of a 2.0 percent average inflation rate for the core personal consumption expenditure deflator. This measure on inflation rate has been well below 2.0 percent ever since the recession began. There had been some evidence that it was rising as the unemployment rate and the labor market tightened.
However, the June data show the core inflation rate at just 1.57 percent over the last year, that is slightly below its reading in prior months. It is very hard to see any story where inflation is about to rise substantially and go above the 2.0 percent target. (And remember, the target is an average, so some period above 2.0 percent is consistent with the target, making up for the years of below 2.0 percent inflation.)
Anyhow, with the inflation rate below the target and showing no signs of accelerating, why would the Fed look to raise rates and slow the economy? If there was a plausible story where inflation could soon pose a serious problem, then a rate hike would be a debatable proposition. But we are in an economy where the labor market continues to show weakness by many measures (low employment rate for prime age workers, high numbers of people involuntarily working part-time, low quit rate, long durations of unemployment spells, and slow wage growth). So what possible basis would the Fed have for raising rates?
I probably shouldn’t make too much of a deal about the edging lower part, after all, we’re just talking a few hundredths of a percentage point, but the real issue is that the inflation rate is not edging higher. The Fed has a target of a 2.0 percent average inflation rate for the core personal consumption expenditure deflator. This measure on inflation rate has been well below 2.0 percent ever since the recession began. There had been some evidence that it was rising as the unemployment rate and the labor market tightened.
However, the June data show the core inflation rate at just 1.57 percent over the last year, that is slightly below its reading in prior months. It is very hard to see any story where inflation is about to rise substantially and go above the 2.0 percent target. (And remember, the target is an average, so some period above 2.0 percent is consistent with the target, making up for the years of below 2.0 percent inflation.)
Anyhow, with the inflation rate below the target and showing no signs of accelerating, why would the Fed look to raise rates and slow the economy? If there was a plausible story where inflation could soon pose a serious problem, then a rate hike would be a debatable proposition. But we are in an economy where the labor market continues to show weakness by many measures (low employment rate for prime age workers, high numbers of people involuntarily working part-time, low quit rate, long durations of unemployment spells, and slow wage growth). So what possible basis would the Fed have for raising rates?
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A NYT article on the prospects for the federal budget deficit under the next president told readers:
“Even without new spending, the federal budget deficit is expected to rise. By 2020, the Congressional Budget Office estimates, the deficit will hit nearly $800 billion, or about 3.7 percent of expected economic output, as increasing entitlement costs for retiring baby boomers take their toll on federal coffers.”
Actually, the main reason the deficit is projected to rise is the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) projection that interest rates will rise. As a result if higher interest rates, the net interest burden is projected to rise by 1.4 percentage points of GDP between 2016 and 2020 (Summary Table 1). This increase is divided into a 0.9 percentage point rise in interest payments and a 0.5 percentage point drop in revenue that the Fed refunds to the Treasury from the interest it receives on the bonds it holds.
The implication is that if the Fed doesn’t raise interest rates and sell off its assets then we would not see this rise in the interest burden or the size of the budget deficit. On this point, it is worth noting that CBO has consistently overstated the rise in interest rates since 2010. It appears to have done so again in its 2016 projections.
A NYT article on the prospects for the federal budget deficit under the next president told readers:
“Even without new spending, the federal budget deficit is expected to rise. By 2020, the Congressional Budget Office estimates, the deficit will hit nearly $800 billion, or about 3.7 percent of expected economic output, as increasing entitlement costs for retiring baby boomers take their toll on federal coffers.”
Actually, the main reason the deficit is projected to rise is the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) projection that interest rates will rise. As a result if higher interest rates, the net interest burden is projected to rise by 1.4 percentage points of GDP between 2016 and 2020 (Summary Table 1). This increase is divided into a 0.9 percentage point rise in interest payments and a 0.5 percentage point drop in revenue that the Fed refunds to the Treasury from the interest it receives on the bonds it holds.
The implication is that if the Fed doesn’t raise interest rates and sell off its assets then we would not see this rise in the interest burden or the size of the budget deficit. On this point, it is worth noting that CBO has consistently overstated the rise in interest rates since 2010. It appears to have done so again in its 2016 projections.
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The NYT gave an analysis of changing attitudes towards trade agreements that completely misrepresented the key issues at stake. The headline pretty much said it all, “both parties used to back free trade. Now they bash it.”
In fact, the current round of deals being negotiated, most importantly the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Pact (TTIP) have little to do with a conventional free trade agenda of lowering tariff barriers and eliminating quotas. With few exceptions, these barriers are already low or have been eliminated altogether.
Rather these deals are about putting in place a regulatory agenda that is being designed to foster corporate interests. The deals provide a backdoor around the normal legislative process, since many of these measures would not receive the support of democratically elected officials.
The agreements are also protectionist in important ways, making patent and copyright protections stronger and longer. (It doesn’t matter if you like these government granted monopolies, they are still protectionist.)
These deals are being largely negotiated in secrecy, with most of the input coming from top corporate executives. Then they are pushed on to the American public as all or nothing propositions, with the proponents arguing not only the economic merits, but rather claiming they are a geo-political necessity.
In the case of the TPP, the Obama administration is now contending that the defeat of the agreement would be devastating to efforts to maintain an alliance of countries to contain China. If this is in fact true, then it is understandable that the public would be outraged over the administration’s decision to let corporate interests get all sorts of special favors included in a deal that the administration now says is essential for national security.
It is incredible that the NYT tried to present the current debate as a narrow one over traditional issues of trade and protection. This is obviously not the case and there are no shortage of experts who could have explained this fact to its reporter. A good place to start would be the Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Krugman, who also happens to be a NYT columnist. Joe Stiglitz, another Nobel Prize-winning economist, could have also explained the nature of these trade agreements to its reporter.
It would be great if the paper tried to do serious reporting on trade rather than just repeating long outdated nonsense about free traders vs. protectionists.
The NYT gave an analysis of changing attitudes towards trade agreements that completely misrepresented the key issues at stake. The headline pretty much said it all, “both parties used to back free trade. Now they bash it.”
In fact, the current round of deals being negotiated, most importantly the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Pact (TTIP) have little to do with a conventional free trade agenda of lowering tariff barriers and eliminating quotas. With few exceptions, these barriers are already low or have been eliminated altogether.
Rather these deals are about putting in place a regulatory agenda that is being designed to foster corporate interests. The deals provide a backdoor around the normal legislative process, since many of these measures would not receive the support of democratically elected officials.
The agreements are also protectionist in important ways, making patent and copyright protections stronger and longer. (It doesn’t matter if you like these government granted monopolies, they are still protectionist.)
These deals are being largely negotiated in secrecy, with most of the input coming from top corporate executives. Then they are pushed on to the American public as all or nothing propositions, with the proponents arguing not only the economic merits, but rather claiming they are a geo-political necessity.
In the case of the TPP, the Obama administration is now contending that the defeat of the agreement would be devastating to efforts to maintain an alliance of countries to contain China. If this is in fact true, then it is understandable that the public would be outraged over the administration’s decision to let corporate interests get all sorts of special favors included in a deal that the administration now says is essential for national security.
It is incredible that the NYT tried to present the current debate as a narrow one over traditional issues of trade and protection. This is obviously not the case and there are no shortage of experts who could have explained this fact to its reporter. A good place to start would be the Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Krugman, who also happens to be a NYT columnist. Joe Stiglitz, another Nobel Prize-winning economist, could have also explained the nature of these trade agreements to its reporter.
It would be great if the paper tried to do serious reporting on trade rather than just repeating long outdated nonsense about free traders vs. protectionists.
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Max Ehrenfreund had an interesting piece reporting on a new analysis of the first round of wage increases from Seattle’s $15 an hour minimum wage law. The higher wage is being phased in between 2015 and 2020. The study found modest average wage gains of 73 cents an hour for low wage workers. The effect was limited in part because the strong economy helped to boost wages, so the minimum wage had less effect than otherwise might have been expected.
But the piece also notes the finding that average work time fell by roughly 15 minutes per week and employment by 1.2 percent. It is important to recognize that this drop in employment does not mean that 1.2 percent low wage workers will have jobs over the course of the year.
These are high turnover jobs. The 1.2 percent drop in employment means that at a point in time, 1.2 percent fewer workers will be employed. What this means for low-wage workers in Seattle is that they can expect to spend more time looking for a new job when they lose or quit their prior job. If they get roughly 7.0 percent more for the hours that they work, but they put in 1–2 percent fewer hours over the course of the year, then they will likely consider themselves better off.
In other words, the finding of some reduction in employment is not necessarily a bad thing. It doesn’t mean that 1.2 percent of Seattle low-wage workforce has been condemned to go the whole year without a job.
Max Ehrenfreund had an interesting piece reporting on a new analysis of the first round of wage increases from Seattle’s $15 an hour minimum wage law. The higher wage is being phased in between 2015 and 2020. The study found modest average wage gains of 73 cents an hour for low wage workers. The effect was limited in part because the strong economy helped to boost wages, so the minimum wage had less effect than otherwise might have been expected.
But the piece also notes the finding that average work time fell by roughly 15 minutes per week and employment by 1.2 percent. It is important to recognize that this drop in employment does not mean that 1.2 percent low wage workers will have jobs over the course of the year.
These are high turnover jobs. The 1.2 percent drop in employment means that at a point in time, 1.2 percent fewer workers will be employed. What this means for low-wage workers in Seattle is that they can expect to spend more time looking for a new job when they lose or quit their prior job. If they get roughly 7.0 percent more for the hours that they work, but they put in 1–2 percent fewer hours over the course of the year, then they will likely consider themselves better off.
In other words, the finding of some reduction in employment is not necessarily a bad thing. It doesn’t mean that 1.2 percent of Seattle low-wage workforce has been condemned to go the whole year without a job.
Read More Leer más Join the discussion Participa en la discusión
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