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Beat the press por Dean Baker

Beat the Press is Dean Baker's commentary on economic reporting. He is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). To never miss a post, subscribe to a weekly email roundup of Beat the Press. Please also consider supporting the blog on Patreon.

The stock market tumbled by 2.0 percent on Friday. Given that the top 1.0 percent hold a grossly disproportionate share of stock wealth, this means they took a big hit. Are we more equal as a society now? Those who like to focus on wealth measures on inequality would have to say yes. And if the market continues to fall (not a prediction, but it certainly is possible that the correction will continue) then we will see a further gain on the inequality front. Suppose it falls 30 to 40 percent, bringing price-to-earnings ratios closer to historic averages. Will the country then look much different than it does today? I'm inclined to say no, at least if the distribution of income has not changed. To my view, the major story on inequality over the last four decades has been the more than doubling of the share of income that goes to the 1.0 percent, from less than 10 percent in the 1970s to slightly more than 20 percent today. The top 0.1 percent have been the biggest gainers in this picture. Wealth has not always followed the same pattern since so much of the wealth of the rich is tied up in stock. We had two big plunges in the stock market during this period, 2000 to 2002, when it fell by more than half, and again between 2007 and 2009. It's hard to see how the poor and middle class were doing any better at these troughs in wealth (2002 and 2009) than they were when wealth was at its peaks before the crashes.
The stock market tumbled by 2.0 percent on Friday. Given that the top 1.0 percent hold a grossly disproportionate share of stock wealth, this means they took a big hit. Are we more equal as a society now? Those who like to focus on wealth measures on inequality would have to say yes. And if the market continues to fall (not a prediction, but it certainly is possible that the correction will continue) then we will see a further gain on the inequality front. Suppose it falls 30 to 40 percent, bringing price-to-earnings ratios closer to historic averages. Will the country then look much different than it does today? I'm inclined to say no, at least if the distribution of income has not changed. To my view, the major story on inequality over the last four decades has been the more than doubling of the share of income that goes to the 1.0 percent, from less than 10 percent in the 1970s to slightly more than 20 percent today. The top 0.1 percent have been the biggest gainers in this picture. Wealth has not always followed the same pattern since so much of the wealth of the rich is tied up in stock. We had two big plunges in the stock market during this period, 2000 to 2002, when it fell by more than half, and again between 2007 and 2009. It's hard to see how the poor and middle class were doing any better at these troughs in wealth (2002 and 2009) than they were when wealth was at its peaks before the crashes.

Mick Mulvaney, the acting director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), effectively decided to incentivize ripoff schemes by taking away the enforcement powers of the CFPB division that is charged with blocking such schemes. As fans of free markets everywhere know, if it possible to make money by designing deceptive financial products that rip off low- and moderate-income people, profit-maximizing companies will do it.

Mick Mulvaney, the acting director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), effectively decided to incentivize ripoff schemes by taking away the enforcement powers of the CFPB division that is charged with blocking such schemes. As fans of free markets everywhere know, if it possible to make money by designing deceptive financial products that rip off low- and moderate-income people, profit-maximizing companies will do it.

As I have pointed out repeatedly, the Republicans story about how their corporate tax cut will benefit everyone hinges on the idea that it will kick off a huge round of new investment. In their telling, investment is hugely responsive to tax rates. This means their tax cut will spark an investment boom. The higher levels of investment will increase productivity, which will eventually lead to higher wages.

We got our first weak test of this story with the Commerce Department’s release of advanced data on capital goods orders for December. As I pointed out, these are orders, not deliveries, so fast-moving companies should have been able to get some in before the end of the month.

Even though the tax bill was not signed until almost the end of the year, its passage was virtually certain by the middle of the month. Furthermore, the outlines had been known since Labor Day, so unless a corporation’s management was sleeping on the job, they had four months to plan their response.

As it turned the initial release showed a modest 0.1 percent drop in new orders for capital goods. Today the Commerce Department released its full report on manufacturing orders for January, with more complete data. This showed a 0.5 percent drop in orders for non-defense capital goods (0.4 percent, excluding aircraft).

Perhaps we will see a different story in future months, but so far it doesn’t look like corporate America is feeling inspired to undertake an investment just yet.

As I have pointed out repeatedly, the Republicans story about how their corporate tax cut will benefit everyone hinges on the idea that it will kick off a huge round of new investment. In their telling, investment is hugely responsive to tax rates. This means their tax cut will spark an investment boom. The higher levels of investment will increase productivity, which will eventually lead to higher wages.

We got our first weak test of this story with the Commerce Department’s release of advanced data on capital goods orders for December. As I pointed out, these are orders, not deliveries, so fast-moving companies should have been able to get some in before the end of the month.

Even though the tax bill was not signed until almost the end of the year, its passage was virtually certain by the middle of the month. Furthermore, the outlines had been known since Labor Day, so unless a corporation’s management was sleeping on the job, they had four months to plan their response.

As it turned the initial release showed a modest 0.1 percent drop in new orders for capital goods. Today the Commerce Department released its full report on manufacturing orders for January, with more complete data. This showed a 0.5 percent drop in orders for non-defense capital goods (0.4 percent, excluding aircraft).

Perhaps we will see a different story in future months, but so far it doesn’t look like corporate America is feeling inspired to undertake an investment just yet.

The Commerce Department gave us more news today indicating that manufacturing isn’t bouncing back like Donald Trump promised. The Commerce Department released its data on construction spending for December.

It turns out that construction of manufacturing plants is down by 11.7 percent from its December 2016 level. It was running at $60,595 million annual pace in December of 2017, down from a $68,624 pace in December of 2016. This probably shouldn’t be a surprise given the $50 billion (0.26 percent of GDP) increase in the size of the trade deficit, but it does go against President Trump’s promises about bringing back manufacturing.

Another noteworthy change was a drop in construction spending on power plants of 10.8 percent. Also, spending on religious facilities fell by 8.3 percent.

The Commerce Department gave us more news today indicating that manufacturing isn’t bouncing back like Donald Trump promised. The Commerce Department released its data on construction spending for December.

It turns out that construction of manufacturing plants is down by 11.7 percent from its December 2016 level. It was running at $60,595 million annual pace in December of 2017, down from a $68,624 pace in December of 2016. This probably shouldn’t be a surprise given the $50 billion (0.26 percent of GDP) increase in the size of the trade deficit, but it does go against President Trump’s promises about bringing back manufacturing.

Another noteworthy change was a drop in construction spending on power plants of 10.8 percent. Also, spending on religious facilities fell by 8.3 percent.

An NYT article noted that people are more likely to work at home now than in the early part of the last decade and that this is reducing energy usage. Near the end, the piece included this paragraph:

“In addition, between 2003 and 2012 the number of part-time workers in the United States almost doubled, from 4.6 million part time workers to 8.3 million, many of whom are involuntarily part-time workers. “The number of people who are spending time at work is going to go down because you’re sort of swapping out a full-time worker for a part-time worker,” said Dr. Simon. That may be good for energy use, but not necessarily so great for the employee’s wallet.”

The problem is choosing 2012 as an endpoint. The labor market has tightened considerably since 2012. The percentage of workers who report working part-time because they could not find full-time jobs is the same now (3.5 percent) as it was in 2003.

Strangely, the piece ignores the much larger number of workers who choose to work part-time. (The workers say they choose to work part-time, that’s how we know.) In the most recent data, this number stood at 21.1 million workers or 13.9 percent of the labor force.

This is also roughly the same as the share in 2003, but the endpoints conceal an important pattern. Voluntary part-time had dropped considerably until 2014 when the main provisions of the Affordable Care Act. The number of people choosing to work part-time rose from 18.9 million in 2013 to 20.9 million last year, an increase of 10.6 percent. This is presumably due to the fact that people were now able to get insurance without working at full-time jobs.

 

Addendum

I thought I would add the link to our paper showing that the rise in voluntary part-time is almost entirely among young parents, the people who we would expect health care insurance to be most important to. Also, just to give numbers here, taking averages for the last three months (single month data is erratic) the number of people reporting that they are working part-time for non-economic reasons rose by 291,000 from the last three months of 2011 to 2012, then fell by 38,000 the following year. In the first year the ACA was fully in effect it rose by 1,043,000.

 

An NYT article noted that people are more likely to work at home now than in the early part of the last decade and that this is reducing energy usage. Near the end, the piece included this paragraph:

“In addition, between 2003 and 2012 the number of part-time workers in the United States almost doubled, from 4.6 million part time workers to 8.3 million, many of whom are involuntarily part-time workers. “The number of people who are spending time at work is going to go down because you’re sort of swapping out a full-time worker for a part-time worker,” said Dr. Simon. That may be good for energy use, but not necessarily so great for the employee’s wallet.”

The problem is choosing 2012 as an endpoint. The labor market has tightened considerably since 2012. The percentage of workers who report working part-time because they could not find full-time jobs is the same now (3.5 percent) as it was in 2003.

Strangely, the piece ignores the much larger number of workers who choose to work part-time. (The workers say they choose to work part-time, that’s how we know.) In the most recent data, this number stood at 21.1 million workers or 13.9 percent of the labor force.

This is also roughly the same as the share in 2003, but the endpoints conceal an important pattern. Voluntary part-time had dropped considerably until 2014 when the main provisions of the Affordable Care Act. The number of people choosing to work part-time rose from 18.9 million in 2013 to 20.9 million last year, an increase of 10.6 percent. This is presumably due to the fact that people were now able to get insurance without working at full-time jobs.

 

Addendum

I thought I would add the link to our paper showing that the rise in voluntary part-time is almost entirely among young parents, the people who we would expect health care insurance to be most important to. Also, just to give numbers here, taking averages for the last three months (single month data is erratic) the number of people reporting that they are working part-time for non-economic reasons rose by 291,000 from the last three months of 2011 to 2012, then fell by 38,000 the following year. In the first year the ACA was fully in effect it rose by 1,043,000.

 

Some folks may have been impressed with Donald Trump’s plan for $1.5 trillion in infrastructure spending over the next decade. This is both because they have little sense of the size of the economy and also because they don’t realize that he is not proposing for most of this spending to come from the federal government.

While he didn’t lay out a specific plan, past documents indicate that he wants the federal government to increase spending by $200 billion, with the rest coming from state and local governments, as well as private investors. Since GDP is projected to be almost $240 trillion over the decade, Trump is proposing to spend an amount equal to a bit more than 0.08 percent of projected GDP.

Some folks may have been impressed with Donald Trump’s plan for $1.5 trillion in infrastructure spending over the next decade. This is both because they have little sense of the size of the economy and also because they don’t realize that he is not proposing for most of this spending to come from the federal government.

While he didn’t lay out a specific plan, past documents indicate that he wants the federal government to increase spending by $200 billion, with the rest coming from state and local governments, as well as private investors. Since GDP is projected to be almost $240 trillion over the decade, Trump is proposing to spend an amount equal to a bit more than 0.08 percent of projected GDP.

An important provision of the new federal tax code was the capping of the deduction for state and local taxes at $10,000. This was an explicit hit at states like New York and California, which have relatively high tax rates in order to provide relatively high-quality services in areas like education and health care. These states also tend to vote Democratic in national elections. One way that these states can partially get around this cap is by replacing a portion of the state income tax with an employer-side payroll tax. This can be in such a way that almost no one would end up paying more in state taxes, but they would effectively be able to still deduct their taxes from their federal income taxes. The way a payroll tax works is that an employer pays it on the worker's wage. If a worker gets paid $50,000 a year and we impose a 5 percent employer-side payroll tax, then the employer would pay $2,500 on this worker's pay. Economists generally believe that employer-side payroll taxes come out of wages. Employers don't care whether they have to pay the money to the worker or to the government, they will pay the same amount in either case. (To make the transition as easy as possible, it should be done in two or three steps, which would mean that workers would more likely be foregoing pay increases rather than looking at actual cuts in pay.) In this case, the new payroll tax would lead to a reduction in this worker's pay of $2,500 to $47,500. But if the worker had been paying 5 percent of their wage to the state income taxes, they are in the exact same position as they had been in previously. They have $47,500 income after the money paid to the state in taxes. The big difference comes when they pay their federal income tax. If they getting paid $50,000 and are unable to deduct their state taxes from their income, they will pay federal taxes on the full $50,000. However, with the employer side payroll tax, they will only pay income tax on the $47,500 they get paid by their employer. This will save them from paying income tax on $2,500 and also Social Security and Medicare taxes on this money.
An important provision of the new federal tax code was the capping of the deduction for state and local taxes at $10,000. This was an explicit hit at states like New York and California, which have relatively high tax rates in order to provide relatively high-quality services in areas like education and health care. These states also tend to vote Democratic in national elections. One way that these states can partially get around this cap is by replacing a portion of the state income tax with an employer-side payroll tax. This can be in such a way that almost no one would end up paying more in state taxes, but they would effectively be able to still deduct their taxes from their federal income taxes. The way a payroll tax works is that an employer pays it on the worker's wage. If a worker gets paid $50,000 a year and we impose a 5 percent employer-side payroll tax, then the employer would pay $2,500 on this worker's pay. Economists generally believe that employer-side payroll taxes come out of wages. Employers don't care whether they have to pay the money to the worker or to the government, they will pay the same amount in either case. (To make the transition as easy as possible, it should be done in two or three steps, which would mean that workers would more likely be foregoing pay increases rather than looking at actual cuts in pay.) In this case, the new payroll tax would lead to a reduction in this worker's pay of $2,500 to $47,500. But if the worker had been paying 5 percent of their wage to the state income taxes, they are in the exact same position as they had been in previously. They have $47,500 income after the money paid to the state in taxes. The big difference comes when they pay their federal income tax. If they getting paid $50,000 and are unable to deduct their state taxes from their income, they will pay federal taxes on the full $50,000. However, with the employer side payroll tax, they will only pay income tax on the $47,500 they get paid by their employer. This will save them from paying income tax on $2,500 and also Social Security and Medicare taxes on this money.
A couple of days ago, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin touched off a firestorm by saying something that is obviously true. He said that a lower-valued dollar would reduce the trade deficit.  As I pointed out yesterday, this is based on the radical concept of downward sloping demand curves. The idea is that when the dollar falls in value relative to other currencies, it makes goods and services produced in the United States cheaper for people living in other countries. This means that they will buy more of our exports. On the other side, a lower-valued dollar means that we will pay more for imports. This means that we would buy fewer goods and services from other countries and instead buy domestically produced goods and services. With fewer imports and more exports, we have a smaller trade deficit. It's all pretty straightforward. But for some reason, Mnuchin's comments prompted widespread outrage, with former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers leading the charge. For the most part, the complaints don't make much sense (yeah, a lower-valued dollar raises the price of imports — that's the point), but one of the central lines seems to be the idea that the Treasury Secretary is not supposed to try to talk down the value of the dollar. I'm not sure where that appears in the Constitution, but others have violated this sacred principle. For example, Lloyd Bentsen, one of Summers' predecessors as Treasury Secretary in the Clinton administration, quite openly suggested that the US would benefit from a lower-valued dollar. Going back a little further, James Baker, who was Treasury Secretary during the Reagan administration, negotiated a decline in the value of the dollar with our major trading partners in the 1985 Plaza Accord. In short, the idea that the Treasury secretary has some obligation to blather about the virtues of a "strong dollar" has no basis in either economics or history.
A couple of days ago, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin touched off a firestorm by saying something that is obviously true. He said that a lower-valued dollar would reduce the trade deficit.  As I pointed out yesterday, this is based on the radical concept of downward sloping demand curves. The idea is that when the dollar falls in value relative to other currencies, it makes goods and services produced in the United States cheaper for people living in other countries. This means that they will buy more of our exports. On the other side, a lower-valued dollar means that we will pay more for imports. This means that we would buy fewer goods and services from other countries and instead buy domestically produced goods and services. With fewer imports and more exports, we have a smaller trade deficit. It's all pretty straightforward. But for some reason, Mnuchin's comments prompted widespread outrage, with former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers leading the charge. For the most part, the complaints don't make much sense (yeah, a lower-valued dollar raises the price of imports — that's the point), but one of the central lines seems to be the idea that the Treasury Secretary is not supposed to try to talk down the value of the dollar. I'm not sure where that appears in the Constitution, but others have violated this sacred principle. For example, Lloyd Bentsen, one of Summers' predecessors as Treasury Secretary in the Clinton administration, quite openly suggested that the US would benefit from a lower-valued dollar. Going back a little further, James Baker, who was Treasury Secretary during the Reagan administration, negotiated a decline in the value of the dollar with our major trading partners in the 1985 Plaza Accord. In short, the idea that the Treasury secretary has some obligation to blather about the virtues of a "strong dollar" has no basis in either economics or history.

The centerpiece of the Republican tax cut was a big reduction in the corporate tax rate, lowering it from 35 percent to 21 percent. While critics argued this was just a handout to shareholders, who are overwhelmingly wealthy, the counter was the tax cut would lead to a surge in growth, which would benefit everyone.

The logic is that a lower tax rate provides more incentive to invest. With new investment in plant, equipment, and intellectual products, productivity will rise. Higher productivity will mean higher wages, which is good news for the bulk of the population that works for a living.

We got the first test of the jump in investment story today when the Commerce Department released data on capital goods orders for December. It is not good for the Republican position. New orders actually fell for the month, dropping by a modest 0.1 percent from the November level. Excluding aircraft orders, which are highly volatile, orders fell 0.3 percent.

These are not huge declines and this series is always erratic, so no one should make a big deal about the reported fall in December. But it certainly is hard to make the case here for some huge tax-induced jump.

If folks think it’s too early to make any assessment, let’s take the Republican argument at face value. They claim that the tax rate makes a huge difference in the investment decisions of firms. While the bill was just signed into law at the end of last month, it was pretty much a sure deal by the 20th. Furthermore, the basic outline was on the table at the start of September.

If the tax rate is really a big deal for investment decisions, then corporate America should have been putting together its list of likely projects as soon as a big tax cut became a clear possibility back in September. By December, forward-looking firms should have been ready to jump as soon as they knew the tax cut would be a reality.

This means that we should have seen at least some of these orders being registered before the end of the year. The fact that there is zero evidence of any uptick suggests that investment decisions are not as sensitive to tax rates as claimed.

It is, of course, early — maybe the January data will tell a different story. But so far, it doesn’t look the Republicans have much of a case. The tax cuts definitely made the rich richer, at this point we don’t have much evidence they will help anyone else.

The centerpiece of the Republican tax cut was a big reduction in the corporate tax rate, lowering it from 35 percent to 21 percent. While critics argued this was just a handout to shareholders, who are overwhelmingly wealthy, the counter was the tax cut would lead to a surge in growth, which would benefit everyone.

The logic is that a lower tax rate provides more incentive to invest. With new investment in plant, equipment, and intellectual products, productivity will rise. Higher productivity will mean higher wages, which is good news for the bulk of the population that works for a living.

We got the first test of the jump in investment story today when the Commerce Department released data on capital goods orders for December. It is not good for the Republican position. New orders actually fell for the month, dropping by a modest 0.1 percent from the November level. Excluding aircraft orders, which are highly volatile, orders fell 0.3 percent.

These are not huge declines and this series is always erratic, so no one should make a big deal about the reported fall in December. But it certainly is hard to make the case here for some huge tax-induced jump.

If folks think it’s too early to make any assessment, let’s take the Republican argument at face value. They claim that the tax rate makes a huge difference in the investment decisions of firms. While the bill was just signed into law at the end of last month, it was pretty much a sure deal by the 20th. Furthermore, the basic outline was on the table at the start of September.

If the tax rate is really a big deal for investment decisions, then corporate America should have been putting together its list of likely projects as soon as a big tax cut became a clear possibility back in September. By December, forward-looking firms should have been ready to jump as soon as they knew the tax cut would be a reality.

This means that we should have seen at least some of these orders being registered before the end of the year. The fact that there is zero evidence of any uptick suggests that investment decisions are not as sensitive to tax rates as claimed.

It is, of course, early — maybe the January data will tell a different story. But so far, it doesn’t look the Republicans have much of a case. The tax cuts definitely made the rich richer, at this point we don’t have much evidence they will help anyone else.

Morning Edition had a lengthy segment telling us that most workers are not worried about automation, even though we hear so much about it. Insofar as this is accurate, these workers are in agreement with the bulk of the economics profession.

Productivity growth (the rate at which technology is displacing workers) had slowed to roughly 1.0 percent annually in the years since 2005. This compares to a 3.0 percent growth rate in the decade from 1995 to 2005 and the long Golden Age from 1947 to 1973. Most economists expect the rate of productivity growth to remain near 1.0 percent as opposed to returning back to something close to its 3.0 percent rate in more prosperous times.

This difference is actually central to the disputes between the Trump administration and Democrats over the tax cuts. The Trump administration argued that the economy could grow at 3.0 percent annually, which would imply productivity growth somewhat over 2.0 percent. Most Democrats derided this view.

If we see a more rapid pace of automation then a 3.0 percent growth rate should be possible. If we actually got back to a 3.0 percent rate of productivity growth, then we could see GDP growth of close to 4.0 percent.

It is also worth noting that the high productivity growth in the period from 1947 to 1973 was associated with low unemployment and rapid wage growth. If another productivity upturn instead leads to high unemployment and weak wage growth it will be the result of deliberate policy to shift the benefits of productivity growth to those at the top end of the income distribution (e.g. government-granted patent and copyright monopolies, high interest rates by the Fed, and trade policy that protects doctors and other highly paid professionals from competition — all discussed in Rigged [it’s free]). It will not be the fault of the robots.

Morning Edition had a lengthy segment telling us that most workers are not worried about automation, even though we hear so much about it. Insofar as this is accurate, these workers are in agreement with the bulk of the economics profession.

Productivity growth (the rate at which technology is displacing workers) had slowed to roughly 1.0 percent annually in the years since 2005. This compares to a 3.0 percent growth rate in the decade from 1995 to 2005 and the long Golden Age from 1947 to 1973. Most economists expect the rate of productivity growth to remain near 1.0 percent as opposed to returning back to something close to its 3.0 percent rate in more prosperous times.

This difference is actually central to the disputes between the Trump administration and Democrats over the tax cuts. The Trump administration argued that the economy could grow at 3.0 percent annually, which would imply productivity growth somewhat over 2.0 percent. Most Democrats derided this view.

If we see a more rapid pace of automation then a 3.0 percent growth rate should be possible. If we actually got back to a 3.0 percent rate of productivity growth, then we could see GDP growth of close to 4.0 percent.

It is also worth noting that the high productivity growth in the period from 1947 to 1973 was associated with low unemployment and rapid wage growth. If another productivity upturn instead leads to high unemployment and weak wage growth it will be the result of deliberate policy to shift the benefits of productivity growth to those at the top end of the income distribution (e.g. government-granted patent and copyright monopolies, high interest rates by the Fed, and trade policy that protects doctors and other highly paid professionals from competition — all discussed in Rigged [it’s free]). It will not be the fault of the robots.

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