Beat the Press

Beat the press por Dean Baker

Beat the Press is Dean Baker's commentary on economic reporting. He is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). To never miss a post, subscribe to a weekly email roundup of Beat the Press. Please also consider supporting the blog on Patreon.

Sorry, I misread that one. This is what he quoted my friend Steve Rose saying about the people who disagree with him on income stagnation. Yes, it's Monday and Robert Samuelson is once again trying to insist that everyone's income is rising just fine. The bizarre part of the story is that no one is really disagreeing on the facts, just how we talk about them. Before-tax income has been largely stagnant over the last four decades. For families at the middle and bottom, there has been some rise, but this has largely been because there are more earners per family, not rising hourly wages. This is primarily the story of women entering the labor force. That was mostly a 1979–2000 story, since women's employment rates have actually slipped somewhat in the last two decades. It's great that barriers to women working are lower today than four decades ago (although discrimination is still huge), but saying that a two-earner family typically has higher income than a one-earner family doesn't really contradict the stagnation story. The way Samuelson shows larger gains for families at the middle and bottom is by including government transfers, most importantly health care programs like Medicaid and SCHIP, in the story. As I pointed out in the past, the value of these transfers increases every time the pay of a heart surgeon or the cost of drugs increase, so people can be excused for not seeing this as a rise in their income.
Sorry, I misread that one. This is what he quoted my friend Steve Rose saying about the people who disagree with him on income stagnation. Yes, it's Monday and Robert Samuelson is once again trying to insist that everyone's income is rising just fine. The bizarre part of the story is that no one is really disagreeing on the facts, just how we talk about them. Before-tax income has been largely stagnant over the last four decades. For families at the middle and bottom, there has been some rise, but this has largely been because there are more earners per family, not rising hourly wages. This is primarily the story of women entering the labor force. That was mostly a 1979–2000 story, since women's employment rates have actually slipped somewhat in the last two decades. It's great that barriers to women working are lower today than four decades ago (although discrimination is still huge), but saying that a two-earner family typically has higher income than a one-earner family doesn't really contradict the stagnation story. The way Samuelson shows larger gains for families at the middle and bottom is by including government transfers, most importantly health care programs like Medicaid and SCHIP, in the story. As I pointed out in the past, the value of these transfers increases every time the pay of a heart surgeon or the cost of drugs increase, so people can be excused for not seeing this as a rise in their income.
This piece was originally posted on my Patreon page. While most of us don’t have access to the inner workings of the Trump administration to know exactly what is going on with its negotiations with China, given the public accounts and statements, it seems workers have clearly lost. Trump seems to have made the concerns of companies like Boeing, who want more help maintaining their control over technology, his top priority. The impact of an undervalued Chinese currency, which has led to a large US trade deficit, seems to have been dropped from discussion. The disappearance of currency “manipulation” from the discussion is more than a bit ironic since Trump made this a centerpiece of his presidential campaign. He ran around the country complaining that China was a world-class currency manipulator. He pledged that he would declare China a currency manipulator on day one of his administration and apply corresponding trade sanctions. We’re getting close to day 700 and there is still no declaration on China’s currency practices. Furthermore, the topic has been virtually dropped from public discussions. What is highlighted is that Trump is pressing China to end practices that require US companies to transfer technology to Chinese partners and also to stop corporate espionage (where Chinese companies infiltrate US companies to obtain their latest technology).[1] Most of the media cover this as though Trump is pursuing a genuine national interest in pressing this issue, as opposed to the interest of a small number of large corporations. This is seriously wrong. In fact, if Trump is successful in pushing his “anti-intellectual property theft” agenda with China, it will actually be bad for most of the nation’s workers.
This piece was originally posted on my Patreon page. While most of us don’t have access to the inner workings of the Trump administration to know exactly what is going on with its negotiations with China, given the public accounts and statements, it seems workers have clearly lost. Trump seems to have made the concerns of companies like Boeing, who want more help maintaining their control over technology, his top priority. The impact of an undervalued Chinese currency, which has led to a large US trade deficit, seems to have been dropped from discussion. The disappearance of currency “manipulation” from the discussion is more than a bit ironic since Trump made this a centerpiece of his presidential campaign. He ran around the country complaining that China was a world-class currency manipulator. He pledged that he would declare China a currency manipulator on day one of his administration and apply corresponding trade sanctions. We’re getting close to day 700 and there is still no declaration on China’s currency practices. Furthermore, the topic has been virtually dropped from public discussions. What is highlighted is that Trump is pressing China to end practices that require US companies to transfer technology to Chinese partners and also to stop corporate espionage (where Chinese companies infiltrate US companies to obtain their latest technology).[1] Most of the media cover this as though Trump is pursuing a genuine national interest in pressing this issue, as opposed to the interest of a small number of large corporations. This is seriously wrong. In fact, if Trump is successful in pushing his “anti-intellectual property theft” agenda with China, it will actually be bad for most of the nation’s workers.

The Corruption from Tariffs on Prescription Drugs

Right, I meant “patents,” but the logic is the same. When you have a government intervention that raises the price above the free market price then you provide a lot incentive for gaming and corruption. The NYT had a very good piece on this topic just last week. Of course the tariffs on clothes that were being evaded/avoided in that piece were just 10-25 percent. By contrast, patent monopolies raise the price of drugs by the equivalent of several thousand percent. Therefore the incentive for corruption is correspondingly larger.

The NYT gives us the latest example in an article on Actelion Pharmaceuticals agreeing to a $360 million settlement in a case being investigated by the Justice Department. The accusation is that the company, which makes a drug to treat a rare lung condition, was making payments to a patient assistance charity as a way of giving kickbacks on its drug.

This is a mechanism that drug companies can effectively use to entice patients to use their drugs. If they give the money to an intermediary like the charity allegedly used in this case, the charity can then use the money to give patients a discount on the company’s drug. This can increase their sales without a general price reduction.

There would be no incentive for this sort of corruption if drugs were sold in a free market. Unfortunately there are not powerful interest groups to oppose patent monopolies as there are with tariffs on clothes, so we don’t see this sort of analysis in major media outlets.

Right, I meant “patents,” but the logic is the same. When you have a government intervention that raises the price above the free market price then you provide a lot incentive for gaming and corruption. The NYT had a very good piece on this topic just last week. Of course the tariffs on clothes that were being evaded/avoided in that piece were just 10-25 percent. By contrast, patent monopolies raise the price of drugs by the equivalent of several thousand percent. Therefore the incentive for corruption is correspondingly larger.

The NYT gives us the latest example in an article on Actelion Pharmaceuticals agreeing to a $360 million settlement in a case being investigated by the Justice Department. The accusation is that the company, which makes a drug to treat a rare lung condition, was making payments to a patient assistance charity as a way of giving kickbacks on its drug.

This is a mechanism that drug companies can effectively use to entice patients to use their drugs. If they give the money to an intermediary like the charity allegedly used in this case, the charity can then use the money to give patients a discount on the company’s drug. This can increase their sales without a general price reduction.

There would be no incentive for this sort of corruption if drugs were sold in a free market. Unfortunately there are not powerful interest groups to oppose patent monopolies as there are with tariffs on clothes, so we don’t see this sort of analysis in major media outlets.

Will Degrowthing Save the Planet?

This is the third piece in an exchange with Jason Hickel on growth. Hickel's response will be the last piece in the series. Jason Hickel responded to my earlier piece on degrowth arguing that in fact, economic growth is inconsistent with a sustainable environment and that we have to get people to reject growth as an economic goal if we are going to limit the damage from climate change and excessive resource use more generally. First, let me point out where we do agree. It is necessary to take drastic measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions quickly. The world is falling far behind a path of emissions reductions (they are still rising) that will prevent excessive damage to the planet. Going beyond the issue of greenhouse gas emissions, we also have to take steps to reduce resource use more generally. The planet is rapidly losing habitat and species in ways that are irreversible. I’m sure Hickel knows the data in these areas better than me, but I would not argue on the basic point. The question is whether degrowth needs to somehow fit into the picture. I will raise two points, one a question of logic and one a practical political issue. On the logical point, I am at loss to understand why we would have a war on growth. Granted, we need to massively reduce our consumption of fossil fuels and over time other material inputs, but I am afraid I don’t see how that this precludes growth. I am certainly willing to believe that a period of rapid increases in carbon taxes may lead to a recession, although I would not even take this as a foregone conclusion. If we spend enough in other areas, it is possible to offset sharp reductions in the sectors of the economy that are heavy users of fossil fuels. (Yes, I know people have modeled this scenario, but I’m afraid that I don’t view such modeling as sacrosanct. Almost no economic models projected the collapse of the housing bubble and the Great Recession. I don’t think economists who can’t tell us what will happen next year in ordinary times suddenly have perfect foresight when we talk about an unprecedented transition in energy use.) But let’s say that the transition brings about a recession. How does that preclude further subsequent growth? The Federal Reserve Board has brought on nine recessions since World War II. Would anyone say the Fed precludes growth? Concretely, when we get to our sustainable level of resource use, I assume we will still have clothes, shelter, computers, etc. These items all wear out. When we replace them, is there some reason the new items would not be better (e.g. longer lasting, clothes that are warmer or cooler etc.) than the ones they replaced? If so, that sure sounds like growth to me.
This is the third piece in an exchange with Jason Hickel on growth. Hickel's response will be the last piece in the series. Jason Hickel responded to my earlier piece on degrowth arguing that in fact, economic growth is inconsistent with a sustainable environment and that we have to get people to reject growth as an economic goal if we are going to limit the damage from climate change and excessive resource use more generally. First, let me point out where we do agree. It is necessary to take drastic measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions quickly. The world is falling far behind a path of emissions reductions (they are still rising) that will prevent excessive damage to the planet. Going beyond the issue of greenhouse gas emissions, we also have to take steps to reduce resource use more generally. The planet is rapidly losing habitat and species in ways that are irreversible. I’m sure Hickel knows the data in these areas better than me, but I would not argue on the basic point. The question is whether degrowth needs to somehow fit into the picture. I will raise two points, one a question of logic and one a practical political issue. On the logical point, I am at loss to understand why we would have a war on growth. Granted, we need to massively reduce our consumption of fossil fuels and over time other material inputs, but I am afraid I don’t see how that this precludes growth. I am certainly willing to believe that a period of rapid increases in carbon taxes may lead to a recession, although I would not even take this as a foregone conclusion. If we spend enough in other areas, it is possible to offset sharp reductions in the sectors of the economy that are heavy users of fossil fuels. (Yes, I know people have modeled this scenario, but I’m afraid that I don’t view such modeling as sacrosanct. Almost no economic models projected the collapse of the housing bubble and the Great Recession. I don’t think economists who can’t tell us what will happen next year in ordinary times suddenly have perfect foresight when we talk about an unprecedented transition in energy use.) But let’s say that the transition brings about a recession. How does that preclude further subsequent growth? The Federal Reserve Board has brought on nine recessions since World War II. Would anyone say the Fed precludes growth? Concretely, when we get to our sustainable level of resource use, I assume we will still have clothes, shelter, computers, etc. These items all wear out. When we replace them, is there some reason the new items would not be better (e.g. longer lasting, clothes that are warmer or cooler etc.) than the ones they replaced? If so, that sure sounds like growth to me.

An Inverted Yield Curve: Should We Be Worried?

An NYT article on the stock market’s plunge also noted that the yield curve, defined as the gap between the interest rate on 10-year Treasury bonds and two-year notes, is close to being inverted. The interest rate on 10-year bonds was just 0.12 percentage points higher than the interest rate on 2-year notes. The piece points out that an inverted yield curve has historically been associated with a recession in the near future.

While I would not rule out a recession (we will have another recession someday), I am less impressed by this signal than the NYT. The longer-term rates tend to follow the expected path of the short-term rate with a longer yield providing a greater premium since the holder of a long-term bond suffers a substantial capital loss if the price goes down.

For example, if I’m holding a 10-year Treasury bond and the interest rate increases from 3.0 percent to 4.0 percent in a relatively short period of time, the price would fall by close to 9.0 percent. To cover that risk, I will want a premium over the short-term rate. The same logic applies to a 2-year note, except that the potential loss from a rise in interest rates is much smaller so the necessary premium is much smaller.

However, the risk in this story is that the Federal Reserve Board will raise interest rates. Currently, the federal funds rate is at 2.25 percent. While there is a good chance the Fed will raise rates by 0.25 percentage points at its meeting this month, Fed Chair Jerome Powell has made it clear that he thinks we are near the end of a cycle of rising rates. For this reason, holders of longer-term debt have less reason to fear that short-term rates will rise much from their current level. Therefore, they are not demanding large risk premiums.

Historically, we have reached this point where investors no longer saw much risk of further rate hikes after a period of aggressive rate increases by the Fed. In 1989, the peak of the federal funds rate was almost 4.0 percentage points above its cyclical low. In the mid-1970s, it was more than 8.0 percentage points, and in 1980 the federal funds rate peaked more than 14.0 percentage points above the low for the cycle. 

When the Fed engages in an aggressive round of rate hikes, it is reasonable to bet we will see a recession. In this case, the Fed has been much more modest in its rate increases. While there is little doubt that the rate hikes are having an effect in slowing the economy — housing has been hit hard and the rise in the dollar is causing the trade deficit to rise — these sources of weakness do not seem sufficient to throw the economy into a recession, even if the yield curve does invert. 

Note: I had earlier put the loss on a 10-year Treasury bond from a rise in the interest rate at 8.0 percent. Joe Emersberger corrected the mistake.

An NYT article on the stock market’s plunge also noted that the yield curve, defined as the gap between the interest rate on 10-year Treasury bonds and two-year notes, is close to being inverted. The interest rate on 10-year bonds was just 0.12 percentage points higher than the interest rate on 2-year notes. The piece points out that an inverted yield curve has historically been associated with a recession in the near future.

While I would not rule out a recession (we will have another recession someday), I am less impressed by this signal than the NYT. The longer-term rates tend to follow the expected path of the short-term rate with a longer yield providing a greater premium since the holder of a long-term bond suffers a substantial capital loss if the price goes down.

For example, if I’m holding a 10-year Treasury bond and the interest rate increases from 3.0 percent to 4.0 percent in a relatively short period of time, the price would fall by close to 9.0 percent. To cover that risk, I will want a premium over the short-term rate. The same logic applies to a 2-year note, except that the potential loss from a rise in interest rates is much smaller so the necessary premium is much smaller.

However, the risk in this story is that the Federal Reserve Board will raise interest rates. Currently, the federal funds rate is at 2.25 percent. While there is a good chance the Fed will raise rates by 0.25 percentage points at its meeting this month, Fed Chair Jerome Powell has made it clear that he thinks we are near the end of a cycle of rising rates. For this reason, holders of longer-term debt have less reason to fear that short-term rates will rise much from their current level. Therefore, they are not demanding large risk premiums.

Historically, we have reached this point where investors no longer saw much risk of further rate hikes after a period of aggressive rate increases by the Fed. In 1989, the peak of the federal funds rate was almost 4.0 percentage points above its cyclical low. In the mid-1970s, it was more than 8.0 percentage points, and in 1980 the federal funds rate peaked more than 14.0 percentage points above the low for the cycle. 

When the Fed engages in an aggressive round of rate hikes, it is reasonable to bet we will see a recession. In this case, the Fed has been much more modest in its rate increases. While there is little doubt that the rate hikes are having an effect in slowing the economy — housing has been hit hard and the rise in the dollar is causing the trade deficit to rise — these sources of weakness do not seem sufficient to throw the economy into a recession, even if the yield curve does invert. 

Note: I had earlier put the loss on a 10-year Treasury bond from a rise in the interest rate at 8.0 percent. Joe Emersberger corrected the mistake.

This post is by Jason Hickel. He is responding to a post I did on the possibility of having growth in a sustainable economy. I will post a rejoinder later in the week. Jason will then get the last word in this exchange. What do Keynesian Democrats think about the movement for post-growth and de-growth economics? Dean Baker, a senior economist at the Center for Economic Policy Research in Washington, DC, has given us some insight into this question. In a recent blog post, republished by Counterpunch, he takes aim at two articles that I wrote for Foreign Policy in which I argue that it is not feasible to reduce our emissions and resource use in line with planetary boundaries while at the same time pursuing exponential GDP growth. Baker agrees — thankfully — that we need to dramatically reduce emissions and resource use to prevent ecological collapse. But he thinks that this is entirely compatible with continued GDP growth.  Let’s imagine, he says, that a new government imposes massive taxes on greenhouse gas emissions and resource extraction while at the same time increasing spending on clean technologies, with subsidies for electric vehicles and mass transit systems. Baker believes that this will shift patterns of consumption toward goods that are less emissions and resource intensive. People will spend their money on movies and plays, for example, or on gyms and nice restaurants and new computer software. So GDP will continue growing forever while emissions and resource use declines. It sounds wonderful, doesn’t it? I, for one, would embrace such an outcome. After all, if growth was green, why would anyone have a problem with it? Baker makes the mistake of believing that degrowthers are focused on reducing GDP. We are not. Like him, we want to reduce material throughput. But we accept that doing so will probably mean that GDP will not continue to grow, and we argue that this needn’t be a catastrophe — on the contrary, it can be managed in a way that improves people’s well-being.
This post is by Jason Hickel. He is responding to a post I did on the possibility of having growth in a sustainable economy. I will post a rejoinder later in the week. Jason will then get the last word in this exchange. What do Keynesian Democrats think about the movement for post-growth and de-growth economics? Dean Baker, a senior economist at the Center for Economic Policy Research in Washington, DC, has given us some insight into this question. In a recent blog post, republished by Counterpunch, he takes aim at two articles that I wrote for Foreign Policy in which I argue that it is not feasible to reduce our emissions and resource use in line with planetary boundaries while at the same time pursuing exponential GDP growth. Baker agrees — thankfully — that we need to dramatically reduce emissions and resource use to prevent ecological collapse. But he thinks that this is entirely compatible with continued GDP growth.  Let’s imagine, he says, that a new government imposes massive taxes on greenhouse gas emissions and resource extraction while at the same time increasing spending on clean technologies, with subsidies for electric vehicles and mass transit systems. Baker believes that this will shift patterns of consumption toward goods that are less emissions and resource intensive. People will spend their money on movies and plays, for example, or on gyms and nice restaurants and new computer software. So GDP will continue growing forever while emissions and resource use declines. It sounds wonderful, doesn’t it? I, for one, would embrace such an outcome. After all, if growth was green, why would anyone have a problem with it? Baker makes the mistake of believing that degrowthers are focused on reducing GDP. We are not. Like him, we want to reduce material throughput. But we accept that doing so will probably mean that GDP will not continue to grow, and we argue that this needn’t be a catastrophe — on the contrary, it can be managed in a way that improves people’s well-being.

Pausing at the Fed

My friend, Jared Bernstein, laid out the case for a pause in the Fed’s interest rate hikes at its meeting this month. I agree with pretty much everything Jared said, but want to push one point a bit further.

Jared raises the argument made by the more hawkish types that we have well-anchored inflationary expectations that we don’t want to risk losing by allowing inflation to accelerate. This line is given as a rationale for hiking interest rates in a context where inflation even now is under the Fed’s 2.0 percent target. And, this target is, of course, an average, meaning that to be consistent with the target we must have some periods with inflation above 2.0 percent.

Note how the threat we are supposed to fear has been pushed back. It is not actual inflation, that we are supposed to fear, or even potential inflation, which we have no reason to expect to jump in response to modest further reductions in the unemployment rate, it is now expectations that we should worry will become unanchored. This is getting pretty far removed from anything we see in the real world and very much into metaphysical land.

While there is nothing wrong with metaphysical speculation in many contexts, this is not one of them. We know that higher interest rates will slow the economy and keep people from getting jobs. The losers in this story are the most disadvantaged in society, blacks, Hispanics, people with less education, and others who face discrimination in the labor market.

To my view, the Fed has an absolute duty to push the unemployment rate as low as it can go until we see real evidence of inflationary pressures. Any honest economist has to admit we don’t know what this level is. Just five years ago, the median estimate at the Fed was 5.4 percent. That clearly was wrong. I would have said something like 4.0 percent, but even this now looks too high. 

The unemployment rate looks likely to get still lower in the months ahead, probably crossing 3.5 percent and likely getting lower. Can it hit 3.0 percent? I don’t know, but let’s see what happens if we try. The potential benefits are enormous and the downsides are shall we say, speculative.

My friend, Jared Bernstein, laid out the case for a pause in the Fed’s interest rate hikes at its meeting this month. I agree with pretty much everything Jared said, but want to push one point a bit further.

Jared raises the argument made by the more hawkish types that we have well-anchored inflationary expectations that we don’t want to risk losing by allowing inflation to accelerate. This line is given as a rationale for hiking interest rates in a context where inflation even now is under the Fed’s 2.0 percent target. And, this target is, of course, an average, meaning that to be consistent with the target we must have some periods with inflation above 2.0 percent.

Note how the threat we are supposed to fear has been pushed back. It is not actual inflation, that we are supposed to fear, or even potential inflation, which we have no reason to expect to jump in response to modest further reductions in the unemployment rate, it is now expectations that we should worry will become unanchored. This is getting pretty far removed from anything we see in the real world and very much into metaphysical land.

While there is nothing wrong with metaphysical speculation in many contexts, this is not one of them. We know that higher interest rates will slow the economy and keep people from getting jobs. The losers in this story are the most disadvantaged in society, blacks, Hispanics, people with less education, and others who face discrimination in the labor market.

To my view, the Fed has an absolute duty to push the unemployment rate as low as it can go until we see real evidence of inflationary pressures. Any honest economist has to admit we don’t know what this level is. Just five years ago, the median estimate at the Fed was 5.4 percent. That clearly was wrong. I would have said something like 4.0 percent, but even this now looks too high. 

The unemployment rate looks likely to get still lower in the months ahead, probably crossing 3.5 percent and likely getting lower. Can it hit 3.0 percent? I don’t know, but let’s see what happens if we try. The potential benefits are enormous and the downsides are shall we say, speculative.

There have been several analyses of the 2018 election results showing that the Republican regions are disproportionately areas that lag in income and growth. In response, we are seeing a minor industry develop on what we can do to help the left behinds.  The assumption in this analysis is that being left behind is the result of the natural workings of the market — developments in technology and trade — not any conscious policy decisions implemented in Washington. This is quite obviously not true and it is remarkable how this assumption can go unchallenged in policy circles. Just to take the most obvious example, the natural workings of the market were about to put most of the financial industry out of business in the fall of 2008. In the wake of the collapse of Lehman, leaders of both the Republican and Democratic parties could not run fast enough to craft a government bailout package to save the big banks, almost all of which were facing bankruptcy due to their own incompetence and corruption.  It is worth contrasting this race to bailout with the malign neglect associated with loss of 3.4 million jobs in manufacturing (20 percent of the total) between 2000 and 2007 (pre-crash). This job loss was primarily due to an explosion in the trade deficit. The latter was due to an overvalued dollar, which in turn was attributable to currency management by China and other countries, that kept their currencies below the market level.  While most economists now acknowledge the impact of China’s currency management, at the time there was a great effort to pretend that this was all just the natural workings of the market. The loss of jobs, and the destruction of families and communities, was not a major concern in elite circles, unlike the prospect of Goldman Sachs and Citigroup going bankrupt.
There have been several analyses of the 2018 election results showing that the Republican regions are disproportionately areas that lag in income and growth. In response, we are seeing a minor industry develop on what we can do to help the left behinds.  The assumption in this analysis is that being left behind is the result of the natural workings of the market — developments in technology and trade — not any conscious policy decisions implemented in Washington. This is quite obviously not true and it is remarkable how this assumption can go unchallenged in policy circles. Just to take the most obvious example, the natural workings of the market were about to put most of the financial industry out of business in the fall of 2008. In the wake of the collapse of Lehman, leaders of both the Republican and Democratic parties could not run fast enough to craft a government bailout package to save the big banks, almost all of which were facing bankruptcy due to their own incompetence and corruption.  It is worth contrasting this race to bailout with the malign neglect associated with loss of 3.4 million jobs in manufacturing (20 percent of the total) between 2000 and 2007 (pre-crash). This job loss was primarily due to an explosion in the trade deficit. The latter was due to an overvalued dollar, which in turn was attributable to currency management by China and other countries, that kept their currencies below the market level.  While most economists now acknowledge the impact of China’s currency management, at the time there was a great effort to pretend that this was all just the natural workings of the market. The loss of jobs, and the destruction of families and communities, was not a major concern in elite circles, unlike the prospect of Goldman Sachs and Citigroup going bankrupt.

The Budget Deficit Does Not Require Foreign Financing

In the middle of a useful article on the trade deficit, the Post told readers:

“Last year’s $1.5 trillion Republican cut in corporate and personal income taxes, along with the decision to eliminate congressional limits on government spending, has revved up the economy and created nearly $1 trillion budget deficits for the coming years that require financing from abroad.”

This is not exactly true.

When the government borrows more money, it pushes upward pressure on interest rates, other things equal. At higher interest rates, foreign investors may choose to buy more US government bonds, but it is also possible that domestic investors will opt to buy more US bonds, as opposed to other assets. This is the reason that interest rates on mortgages and corporate debt have risen in the last year. Investors who might have otherwise held these assets are instead choosing to buy government bonds.

If no foreigners opted to buy the newly issued debt, interest rates would rise to the point where enough US investors were willing to hold the debt. The fact that foreigners are willing to buy US bonds means that interest rates would not rise as much as would otherwise be the case (holding the response of the Fed constant), but the US does not need foreigners to buy our debt.

In the middle of a useful article on the trade deficit, the Post told readers:

“Last year’s $1.5 trillion Republican cut in corporate and personal income taxes, along with the decision to eliminate congressional limits on government spending, has revved up the economy and created nearly $1 trillion budget deficits for the coming years that require financing from abroad.”

This is not exactly true.

When the government borrows more money, it pushes upward pressure on interest rates, other things equal. At higher interest rates, foreign investors may choose to buy more US government bonds, but it is also possible that domestic investors will opt to buy more US bonds, as opposed to other assets. This is the reason that interest rates on mortgages and corporate debt have risen in the last year. Investors who might have otherwise held these assets are instead choosing to buy government bonds.

If no foreigners opted to buy the newly issued debt, interest rates would rise to the point where enough US investors were willing to hold the debt. The fact that foreigners are willing to buy US bonds means that interest rates would not rise as much as would otherwise be the case (holding the response of the Fed constant), but the US does not need foreigners to buy our debt.

The Washington Post told readers that when the deficit figures for 2018 were released last month:

“The announcement unnerved Republicans and investors, helping fuel a big sell-off in the stock market.”

The claimed impact on the market seems implausible. In April, after analyzing the effect of the tax cuts, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projected the deficit for the 2018 fiscal year would be $804 billion. The figure for the deficit that was reported last month was $779 billion, $25 billion less than what CBO had projected six months earlier. It is hard to believe that a deficit that was slightly lower than projected could cause a big sell-off in the stock market.

It is also worth noting that this piece makes zero effort to put any numbers in context. Since almost none of the Post’s readers has any idea of the meaning of the deficit and debt numbers used in the piece, it is difficult to see why they would use them. It is not hard to express these numbers as a share of GDP and relative to the size of past deficits, measured as a share of GDP. In fact, CBO actually expressed the deficits and debt as shares of GDP in its report, so it is not even necessary to do the arithmetic.

The Washington Post told readers that when the deficit figures for 2018 were released last month:

“The announcement unnerved Republicans and investors, helping fuel a big sell-off in the stock market.”

The claimed impact on the market seems implausible. In April, after analyzing the effect of the tax cuts, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projected the deficit for the 2018 fiscal year would be $804 billion. The figure for the deficit that was reported last month was $779 billion, $25 billion less than what CBO had projected six months earlier. It is hard to believe that a deficit that was slightly lower than projected could cause a big sell-off in the stock market.

It is also worth noting that this piece makes zero effort to put any numbers in context. Since almost none of the Post’s readers has any idea of the meaning of the deficit and debt numbers used in the piece, it is difficult to see why they would use them. It is not hard to express these numbers as a share of GDP and relative to the size of past deficits, measured as a share of GDP. In fact, CBO actually expressed the deficits and debt as shares of GDP in its report, so it is not even necessary to do the arithmetic.

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